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In 1975 Israel and the EEC signed a preferential trade agreement, which
included provision for free trade in manufactured goods betereen the sig-
natories by 1989 at the latest. The present study examines the economic
consequences for Israel of such a free trade area. Although political fac-
tors are clearly important in determining the course of EEC-Israel relat-
ions, analysis of their economic aspects is facilitated by abstracting from
the political issues. Within this framework, the free trade area can be seen
as a case of mutual preferences between a large economically developed
bloc and a small semi-industrialized country.
During the 1960s economists and policy-makers, dissatisfied with the re-
sults of industrialization by import substitution, began to advocate the ex-
port of manufactures according to comparative advantage as a suitable de-
velopment strategy for the less-developed countries (LDCs). A major
obstacle to the success of this strategy was considered to be the tariff bar-
riers existing in the high-income countries, where the largest markets lay,
and the UN Conference on Trade and Development expended much energy be-
tween 1964 and 1971 in negotiating a system of preferential tariffs to be
offered to LDCs. The intention was that eighteen developed countries would
participate in the common system, but lack of agreement led to each country
or bloc adopting a separate scheme. The individual preference systems which
have emerged have come under a great deal of criticism, because they ex-
clude some manufactured goods (usually the ones i n which the LDCs have
a comparative advantage) and place ceilings on preferential trade in other
, 1 goods.
The inadequacy of the general systems of preferences has led some of the
countries interested in pursuing a development strategy based on manufactured
export expansion to seek more useful preferences via bilateral agreements.
The first point is made in Murray (1973a) and the second in Murray (1973b).- 2 -
The most far-reaching of such agreements are those negotiated between the
EEC and the Mediterranean countries. The various ad hoc agreements have
gradually evolved into the Global Mediterranean Policy, under which a free
trade area involving the EEC and the entire Mediterranean littoral is envisaged.
The 1975 EEC-Israel agreement is, in its economic aspects, one of the most
advanced steps in that policy. Other Mediterranean countries have been less
willing than Israel to expose their manufacturing sectors to EEC competition
and will closely follow the effects on Israel of the mutual preferences.
The theoretical framework for analyzing free trade areas has been developed
in a branch of economics known as customs union theory. Two questions have
dominated the theoretical discussions: (i) what are the sources of welfare
gains and losses, (ii) are there any valid economic reasons for forming a
customs union or free trade area? The aswers to the former question have
been well-defined in theory, but empirical studies have been primarily re-
2
stricted to unions between developed countries (overwhelmingly to the EEC).
A satisfactory positive answer to the latter question has yet to be found, and
in the conclusion of the present study it will be appropriate to ask whether the
free trade area represents the optimal economic policy for Israel.
The study is divided into two parts. The first part provides the theoretical,
historical and institutional background necessary for analyzing the proposed
free trade area. Part Two contains the analysis of the effects of the free trade
area on Israel. The analysis is undertaken at a macroeconomic level and aims
to provide orders of magnitude rather than exact measures; the shortcomings
of the chosen aggregation level are most noticeable with respect to the con-
sequences for factor productivity. A simplifying assumption is that the Israeli
economy is a Marshallian pure competitor in world markets and that her
import demand can be fully satisfied by the EEC at the world price. Since
this assumption is highly important for the estimates, its empirical relevance
is examined in an appendix. The analysis is restricted to the so-called primary
and secondary effects of preferences and ignores the less direct, or "tertiary",
effects such as the consequences of exchange rate adjustments resulting from
the trade effects of the preferences.
The literature is reviewed in Sellekaerts (1973) and Balassa (1975).PART ONE
THE BACKGROUND- 3 -
Chapter 2: The Theoretical Background
The economic theory of preferential trading has developed rapidly in the
last 25 years. Before that time customs unions had been able to appeal to
proponents of both free trade and protection, because they contained ele-
ments of both policies. With the development of the general theory of the
second best in the 1950s, however, it was recognized that a policy of pre-
ferential tariff reductions may be inferior to a policy of no tariff reductions.
The present chapter opens by surveying the arguments in favour of free trade
or protection as the optimal policy for a small semi-industrialized country
like Israel. This is followed by a review of the sources of gains and losses
from a free trade area between a small semi-industrialized country and a
large industrialized partner, from the former's point of view. Although there
are several sources of gain and few sources of loss for the small country,
the major conclusion of customs union theory is that the free trade area can
never be a superior policy to unilateral tariff elimination. The chapter ends
with a preview of how the gains and losses to Israel of free trade with the
EEC are to be estimated in Part Two.
1. Free Trade vs. Protection as the Engine for Industrialization
Before coming down to the customs union issue it may be useful to overview
the arguments pro and contra free trade. To bring the discussion rapidly
towards relevance to Israel, two arguments in favour of free trade can be
ignored. Firstly, free trade can stimulate demand and lead to idle resources
being brought into use, but the Israeli economy is already operating at full
employment. Secondly, trade can be a vehicle for the dissemination of know-
ledge, but for Israel this role is likely to be minimal because her business
community is internationally oriented and highly aware of product innovations
in developed countries' markets.
The fundamental argument in favour of free trade rests on the static gains
from trade. By trading according to comparative advantage a country is able
to operate on a higher social indifference curve than in the no "trade situation(Samuelson (1962)). The static gains can be related to the dynamic process
of industrialization in several ways. The augmenting of available resources
should lead to an increase in domestic savings. A second argument refers to
the case where capital goods can only be produced domestically at prohibitive
cost, so that the constraint on implementing a social preference for purchas-
ing capital goods in order to foster economic growth is the economy's ability
to transform domestic resources into foreign exchange. A purely dynamic
gain from trade arises if export markets provide more profitable outlets than
domestic markets and hence encourage capital formation. This will be parti-
cularly* potent if the country's comparative advantage is in products where
unrealized scale economies are large at output levels supplying the domestic
market alone (Pomfret (1975)).
For a real-income-maximizing country arguments in favour of protection
can only rest on one of two foundations: a terms of trade effect or the
existence of distortions. Since Israel is unable to affect its terms of trade
(the "small country" assumption), the former is inapplicable to the present
case. Since international markets are in general highly competitive, the
distortions which could form the basis of a protectionist argument must be
domestic, in which case an optimal production tax-cum-subsidy will exist
and will be the first-best solution. The issue is clouded, however, by the
possibility of the first-best solution being infeasible for political, administra-
tive or other reasons, in which case a tariff may be the best feasible solution
and superior to free trade. Once this possibility is admitted, there is no
difficulty in finding domestic distortions in a developing economy. The oldest
and most intellectually respectable is the infant industry argument based on
the existence of externalities, which reduce the private return on a long-term
investment below the social return. Further features of developing countries
The foreign exchange constraint on development has been frequently dis-
cussed in the economic literature. There is some debate as to whether it
is the binding constraint on growth and whether it is in fact independent of
the savings constraint. The earliest exposition of the argument was related
to Israel (Cheneryand Bruno (1962)) and Israeli policy-makers continue to
consider it the binding constraint for that country.- 5 -
are factor price distortions and a predilection for industry (reflected in the
relative private return on manufacturing activity being lower than is implied
by the society's objective function), which are revealed in subsidies to capital
goods imports and to domestic industry via LDCs' tariff structure. In the
presence of any of these, and other, market distortions protection can be
justified if no superior policy package is considered feasible. The difficulties
of identifying externalities, social objective functions, etc. and of judging the
2
feasibility of untried policies make this conclusion rather amorphous.
The lack of clear conclusions from economic theory has led to appeals to
3
economic history, but the experience of the developed countries of Europe
and North America lends itself to divergent explanations. At first sight trade
appears to have been an important factor in England's industrial growth, but
not in that of nineteenth century Germany or North America. Advocates of free
trade could, however, see a significant role for exports in German industrial
growth insofar as some of her most distinctive industrial products (e, g,
chemicals and machinery) showed high rates of export growth in the latter
part of the century (Hoffman (1965), p. 151) and, although exports of manufac-
tured goods were not important in North America, the initial stimulus for ag-
gregate economic growth has been identified with "staple" exports. An alter-
native view of the historical evidence, while admitting the benefits of free
trade for English industrial growth, claims that the first industrial nation
was a unique case and that successful later industrializers developed their
2
There is also aschool of thought favouring protection on the negative grounds
that free trade is harmful to the less-developed country, partly because
the LDC is tied to products with little growth potential, but mainly because
the social consequences of "dependence" limit development. The specific
content of these theories appears not to be justified by the facts, but their
more abstract (and most potent) features are not easily testable.
For example, Haberler in his survey of international trade theories con-
cluded with regard to the choice of national development policies that:
"Economic history has more to offer than theoretical analysis for the
solution of these problems" (Haberler (1961), p. 58).- 6 -
4
manufacturing sectors behind protective barriers. This is not the place to
resolve the historical dispute, but, if we expand our time horizon, it can be
concluded that the lessons for today's LDCs are indecisive. Expansion of
foreign trade is neither a necessary (cf. Soviet Russia) nor a sufficient (cf.
Holland whose commercial development surpassed that of England in the
seventeenth century) condition for industrial growth, but it was part of a
successful industrialization strategy in some countries (not only England,
but also some of the small European nations). In sum, the historical expe-
rience of the developed countries provides little guide as to the optimum trade
policy for an LDC today.
The post-1945 experience of developing countries also offers little guidance
to the relative merits of free trade and protection. Almost all LDCs inter-
ested in industrialization relied heavily on protection during the 1950s and a
small number, including Israel, were successful. In the 1960s the "success
stories" turned to more outwar-looking development strategies and continued
to develop industrially. This evidence could be used in support of either
protection or free trade. It has also been used as the basis for a sequential
theory of the optimal trade policy, i. e. import substitution and export
expansion are not alternative paths to industrialization but the former should
precede the latter (Paauw and Fei (1973)).
The reasons why a protectionist trade regime should be a necessary pre-
cursor of free trade for an industrializing country have never been rigorous-
ly stated. On the macroeconomic level there is no obvious argument why
this should be true, and there is no a priori reason why the optimal bundle
of projects at any point in time should not include both importsubstituting
and exporting projects. For an individual industry there may be a second-
best case for the precedence of protectionism if learning by doing exists,
especially if the learning effects are connected with quality improvements
4
E.g. Bairoch (1972). It has recently been argued that even the English
cotton industry developed first behind protective barriers against
competing Indian products and only later became an exporter (Rostow
(1975), esp. pp. 61-6); for consideration of this sequential view of
protection and free trade see below.- 7 -
or if transport costs are high. In industries where transport costs are very
high import substitution may represent the limit of growth and some of these
industries may have relatively low cost benefit ratios, but in such cases the
protection is natural and tariff barriers are redundant. For these reasons
import-substituting projects may have a greater weight in the earlier stages
of industrialization than in the later stages.
A major factor determining the optimum balance between import substituting
and exporting projects in a country is size. The concept of a country's
economic size is many-sided, but two aspects are important here: the range
of natural endowments and the level of domestic demand. Import substitution
will be more important if the country has a wide range of natural resources,
especially fertile land and natural resource production inputs, and if the
country has a large enough population (and/or initial income level) that the
minimum economic scale of production can soon be covered by domestic
demand in sectors where economies of scale are significant, i.e. especially
in capital goods industries. Thus it is not surprising that the U.S.A. and the
U.S.S.R. could remove any foreign exchange constraint by domestic produc-
tion of import substitutes, but such a strategy is not valid for small LDCs
today, who must pursue a more outward-looking development strategy.
A definitive solution to the hoary problem of whether free trade or protection
is the superior engine for industrialization cannot be expected here, but some
conclusions can be drawn for Israel. The most rigorous theoretical arguments
are in favour of free trade, but the protectionists have some potent, but un-
provable, arguments too. The experience of the industrialized countries and
the more successful LDCs can likewise be enrolled to support either stand-
point. Two factors, however, point to the protectionist arguments having
limited relevance to Israel. Firstly, Israel is already a semi-industrialized
A perfect example of this is Cuba, which adopted a Soviet-style autarchic
industrialization policy in 1959. The policy succeeded while free (i.e.. un-
employed or expropriated) resources could be utilized, but as soon as these
were exhausted it becom clear that many industrial products could only be
manufactured at prohibitive cost. The return to a more outward-looking
policy of trading by comparative advantage was achieved by 1964 - a mere
five years after the revblution.- 8 -
country with developed administrative capacities and political system. If
the sequential theory of trade policies has any validity, then Israel has al-
most certainly reached the free-trade stage. More importantly, the superior
policy responses to domestic distortions are likely to be feasible in Israel,
thus removing the principal theoretical argument in favour of tariffs.
Secondly, Israel is a small resource-poor economy and should therefore be
expected to require an outward-looking strategy very early in the industrial-
ization process.
2. Customs Union Theory
Although the customs union is not a new phenomenon in economic history,
the theory behind it received little attantion from economists before 1950.
The reason for neglect was that the beneficial nature of CUs appeared clear
to both protectionists and free-traders. The former position is illustrated
by the attitude of List and his followers to the German Zollverein of 1834,
which they saw as an ideal institutional framework within which the German
states could develop their infant industries for an increased domestic market
protected from English competition. Free-traders could see CUs as a move-
ment towards free trade, hence leading to increased world welfare even if
not to a welfare maximum. The great contribution of Viner was to show that
this conclusion was false. Since 1950 CU theory has developed along two
paths. The first reaction to Viner's work was to search for the conditions
under which CUs could lead to welfare losses. In the 1960s there was a shift
in interest towards the question of why the rational government should enter
a CU at all. These two areas will be reviewed in turn.
Definitions of the various stages of economic integration are imperfectly
agreed upon. A customs union is generally considered to involve abolition
of trade barriers between members and implementation of a common
tariff rate on imports from non-members, whereas a free trade area in-
volves the former but not the latter. Thus, the present study is dealing
with a free trade area in manufactured goods. The theoretical issues re-
viewed in the present section apply equally to a CU and a FTA, but the
field of study is invariably referred to as customs union theory.- 9 -
The welfare gains and losses from CUs may arise from a number of sources
(Lipsey (1960), p. 496):
(1) specialization of production according to comparative advantage,
(2) economies of scale,
(3) changes in the terms of trade,
(4) forced changes in efficiency due to increased foreign competition,
(5) a change in the rate of economic growth.
CU theory has concentrated on (1), with some discussion of (2). Source (3)
has also received some attention, but is ignored here because the present
study employs the "small country" assumption throughout. The remaining
sources have scarecely been dealt with at all - (4) is ruled out in traditional
economic theory by the assumption that production always occurs on the
boundary of the production possibility set. In addition to the five sources listed
above welfare may be indirectly affected through government attempts to deal
with other consequences of the CU, e. g. balance of payments disequilibrium.
Viner showed that the specialization of production following the formation of
a CU is not necessarily welfare-increasing (Viner (1950), ch. 4). If country
A imports good x from a third country before forming a CU with country B
but after forming the CU imports x from B, then trade diversion has occurred.
If B's production costs are higher than those of the third-country, then there
is clearly a possibility of welfare losses for country A and the world. Much
of the literature on CUs has been devoted to establishing conditions under
7
which a trade-diverting CU can lead to welfare gains. The problem is avoid-
ed in the present study by assuming that the EEC can supply all manufactured
goods at the "world price", i. e. any trade diversion which occurs is welfare
neutral for Israel because her import price is unaffected.
7
The literature is surveyed by Krauss ((1972), pp. 413-7), who considers
the issue a non-problem because all real world CUs are likely to contain
both production and consumption effects (the former negative, the latter
positive) and to categorize them as trade-diverting or trade creating (the
former bad, the latter good) is unhelpful (and was not Viner's intention).- 10 -
The possibility of realizing scale economies within a CU has long been
considered a major argument in favour of CUs. Economists' opinions of
the argument have been varied, largely because empirical evidence of the
practical importance of scale economies is inconclusive. Corden argued
that incorporation of scale economies into CU theory means that the concepts
of trade creation and trade diversion must be supplemented by the additional
o
concepts of a cost reduction effect and trade suppression. Since he believes
that "the cost-reduction effect is likely to be the more important of the two"
(Corden (1972), p. 469), Ccrden's analysis implies that the presence of scale
g
economies tilts the welfare balance in favour of a net gain , but the theoretic-
al possibility of a net welfare loss remains.
Theoretical generalizations about the particular circumstances under which
CUs are most likely to raise welfare rest heavily on the resource allocation
effects (sources (1) and (2)). Viner's conclusion was that a CU is more like-
ly to bring gain the more similar is the class of commodities produced under
tariff protection in the partners (Viner (1950), p. 51). The gains will be
larger if the difference in costs of production in the partner countries is
large (Makower and Morton (1953)). These conclusions imply that a free
trade area with a bloc of developed countries is more likely to be beneficial
for a semi-industrialized country than for an LDC. It can also be shown that
forming a CU with B is more likely to raise A's welfare if her trade with B
o
Corden ((1972), pp. 467-8) justifies the new terminology by arguing that
the cost reduction effect is the result of the cheapening of an existing
source of supply (rather than of movement to a cheaper source) and trade
suppression is due to third country imports being replaced by more ex-
pensive domestic production (rather than by higher cost imports from the
partner country). Krauss ((1972), pp. 420-1) argues that the two addition-
al effects are no more than integral parts of trade creation and trade
diversion, suitably defined to allow for non-constant cost curves.
9
In an independent, but similar, analysis Wonnacott and Wonnacott (1967)
reach the same conclusion. Their approach is examined more closely in
chapter 7.- 11 -
is high relative to her trade with other countries and if her total foreign
trade is low relative to her domestic purchases (Lipsey (1960), p. 508),
Finally, the theory of the second-best shows that a preferential tariff
reduction is more likely to raise welfare than a preferential tariff eliminat-
ion (Lipsey and Lancaster (1956), section 5). It may be noted, however, that
most cf these generalizations are based on the negative consideration of
reducing trade diversion. If trade diversion does not take place because the
partner exports at world prices, then the last two generalizations no longer
hold and indeed the welfare gain will be higher if foreign trade is high relative
to domestic purchases and if tariffs are eliminated. Furthermore, a country
interested in industrialization may rank improved resource allocation below
economic growth and the circumstances under which CUs can increase
economic growth may be quite different from those discussed here.
The possibility of trade diversion means that a non-preferential tariff
elimination policy is necessarily superior to joining a CU as a meansof
reaping the benefits of free trade. The fact that CUs cannot be justified on
resource allocation grounds raises the question of why countries ever form
CUs. This question focussed attention on the sources of welfare gain not
analyzed by CU theory, (4) and (5) above, but these turn out to be arguments
for non-preferential tariff reductions as much aa for a CU (Krauss (1972),
pp. 419-21). The only valid economic rationale for a CU is the possibility of
a terms of trade effect benefitting members of the CU (or groups within the
member countries) at the expense of outsiders, but this consideration is far
from general and does not apply at all to a "small country". Johnson (1965)
and Cooper and Massell (1965) have developed a semi-economic rationale
by introducing a public good (which may be nationalism or industry concept-
ualized as a collective good) into the social welfare function. In this case a
CU may be superior to non-preferential tariff reduction because some of the
trade diversion represents a reduction in loss of the public good, but the
first-best solution would involve direct production subsidies and the CU can
only be justified if such subsidies are not feasible. The conclusion that CUs
are non-economic institutions does not reduce the need to estimate the costs- 12 -
and benefits of a given CU. Although the non-economic benefits from a CU
may be difficult to calculate, it is useful to know the economic costs or
venefits compared to the pre-CU situation and the economic costs of the CU
compared to a unilateral free-trade regime.
3. Conclusions
For a small resource-poor semi-industrialized country free trade appears
to be the optimum tariff policy. The free trade area with the EEC represents
a means for Israel to move closer to such a policy, assuming that no trade
diversion occurs. The sources of welfare gain are analyzed in Part Two
within the framework outlined in the second section of the present chapter.
Since no adjustment mechanism for external balance is specified, it is also
necessary to estimate the effects of the FTA on Israel's balance of trade.
An argument for the rationality of the FTA from Israel's point of view is
presented in the final chapter.- 13 -
Chapter 3: The Historical Background: Israel's Economic Development,
Trade Policy and Trade History
The effects of free trade with the EEC will be greatly influenced by the
present structure and historical evolution of the Israeli economy. The present
chapter surveys the course of Israel's economic development since the
founding of the state in 1948. The atQ&rces of her phenomenal growth rate
are analyzed and prospects for future growth are considered. The govern-
ment's trade policy during the development process is described in the second
section. Finally, the historical development of Israel's exports and imports
is described, with particular emphasis on the importance of manufactured
goods, the distribution of trading partners and the determinants of Israel' s
manufactured export growth.
1. Israel's Economic Development
The most striking feature of Israeli economic history is her rapid economic
growth. Israel' s annual growth rate of real GDP was 10. 4 % in the 1950s and
8.8 % in the 1960s. Thus, although Israel's 1950 per capita income of $ 300
in 1950 placed her much closer to the wealthier LDCs than to the developed
countries, by 1975 her per capita income was well above all the non-oil
LDCs' and similar to some developed countries' . At the same time, the
structure of production in Israel has approached that of the developed
countries as an earlier emphasis on agriculture has been replaced by re-
cognition that Israel' s best prospects for growth lie in the industrial sector.
In the 1970s about 25 % of Israeli GDP originates in industry, which is less
than in most developed countries, but the Israeli figure is depressed by the
high proportion of government services in GDP. The major distinction
between Israel and the developed countries is her continued reliance on
capital inflows to cover a trade deficit which amounted to 33 % of GNP in
1973.
The 1950 figure is from Bruno (1972), p. 94. Calculation of 1975 per
capita income in US dollars is complicated by the varying exchange rate.- 14 -
Productivity studies have shown growth in the capital input to have been the
2
major source of Israel' s GNP growth . This reflects the high investment/
output ratios since 1950 (with the temporary exception of the 1965-7 recession)
with 20 - 25 % of GDP going to capital formation, which is greater than the
ratio in today' s LDCs or in the industrialized countries during their early
stages of economic development. Israel' s capital accumulation has required
no sacrifice of domestic consumption (net domestic savings have been almost
3
zero), since it has been financed by a massive capital inflow . A second
source of GNP growth has been the human input. From a base of some
800, 000 people in 1948-9 (of which 650, 000 were Jewish) the population had
increased to 3.4 million by the end of 1974. Furthermore the quality of the
labour force, especially the "initial endowment" in 1948-9, was extremely
4
high . A final distinguishing feature of Israel' s performance is the relatively
high residual found in sources of growth studies , which is most likely ex-
plained in terms of national identity and enthusiasm among the population to
work towards national economic development.
Israel is often thought to be a "special case" in that her problems and
advantages are so unique as to render comparisons and lessons for other
o
cf. Bruno (1972), pp. 95-6, and Gaathon (1969).
3
Capital imports since 1949 have exceeded $ 10, 000 m. (on a per capita
basis $ 150-200 p. a. - more than the per capita income of many LDCef),
mainly from World Jewry, German reparations and restitution payments
and U.S. aid.
R. Easterlin concluded that "it is no exaggeration to say that in 1948 the
educational level of the Jewish population in Israel was close to the highest
in the world" (Easterlin (1961), p. 71).
The "residual" in sources of growth studies is that part of economic
growth which is not accounted for by growth in the variables included in
the analysis. Since the Israeli studies only include labour and capital
inputs and use a Cobb-Douglas production function, it may reflect
misspecification of the aggregation production function or omission of
important variables. It is, however, usually assumed to reflect the
importance of non-economic variables (e.g. see Pack (1971)).- 15 -
developing countries invalid. The preceding paragraph made it clear that
Israel did possess special advantages from her position as the Jewish state,
especially the inflow of human and financial capital, which are not available
to other LDCs. Nevertheless, the sources of Israel' s economic growth are
precisely those factors which are recognized by economists as the necessary
ingredients in a natural-resource-poor economy; i. e. the Israeli case is not
qualitatively unique in the factors explaining her growth, although she has
been fortunate in the speed with which these factors have accrued.
Some reduction in Israel' s growth rate may be expected as the rate of factor
growth slows down. Despite the high proportion of children in the Israeli
population and the current low participation rate of women, the labour force
is expected to grow more slowly than in the past because of reduced
immigration . This conclusion could be altered by increased emigration of
Russian Jews, but the numbers that this would involve are uncertain. The
major source of capital, transfers from abroad, may also be reduced as
German restitution and pension payments are phased out. These adverse
trends will be, at least in part, offset by increased productivity as human
capital per capita increases. Gains in allocative efficiency may also be reaped
as production shifts towards the more skill-intensive industrial branches.
Finally, a lower economy-wide capital-output ratio than in the past may
permit the same rate of production, because new housing needs are falling.
On balance, it appears that Israel' s economy will continue to grow but at
a slightly slower rate than in the 1960s.
The actual performance of the Israeli economy will be closely related to the
security position in the Middle East. Constant military preparedness involves
a drain on the civilian economy insofar as the military sector makes priority
claims on scarce resources, i. e. labour and capital are directed from
production for home civilian demand and for export, and the share of defence
In 1975 emigration exceeded immigration for the first time in a decade.
This is, however, clearly a short-term response to the depressed state
of the Israeli economy, rather than an indication of long-term trends.- 16 -
expenditure in Israel' s GNP is one of the highest in the world. The high
personal tax levels required to finance the expenditure may fcave the further
effect of undermining incentives. There are some compensatory "spin-off"
effects of the near-war economy, but it is most unlikely that they outweigh
the costs. Peace in the Middle East would reduce these costs, as well as
opening up new export markets for Israel and providing a more attractive
environment for private foreign investment. Renewed open hostilities would,
on the other hand, disrupt production and trade. If the experience of 1967
and 1973 can be relied upon, the short-run disruption can soon be made
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good , but the longer-term consequences, in particular the new arms races
which are set in motion and the psychological effects of victory or defeat,
are very important. Although the post-1967 boom was partly a recovery from
the 1965-7 recession, it can also be attributed in part to a tremendous
upsurge in confidence in Israel. This was most concretely reflected in the
increased inflow of private capital, which is known to be favourably affected
by the prospect of political stability. In contrast, direct foreign private
investment in Israel was reduced after October 197 3. At the same time more
cases of foreign companies complying with the Arab boycott were reported,
presumably reflecting a feeling in the international business communities that
Israel was no longer the side to put one' s money on.
The worldwide recession coupled with the adverse effects of the 1973 war
made the years 1974-6 difficult for the Israeli economy. According to
preliminary estimates, GNP declined in 1975 by some 2 %, the first decrease
since 1953 and in stark contrast to the high pre-1973 growth rates. Invest-
ment fell in 1974 and 1975, and is expected to fall again in 1976. Stagnant
Industrial production reached a new peak in the fcorth quarter of 1967 and
similarly the immediate disruption of the October 1973 war had been
overcome by the first quarter of 1974. The lack of major disruption
followed primarily from the nature of the wars, which were not long lasting
and which did not touch upon Israeli centres of population (and production).
It may be expected that the great powers will prevent the next war from
lasting long, but the possibility of attacks on population centres must be
considered more likely as the missile stocks of the combatants increase.- 17 -
production has been accompanied by rapid inflation as the consumer price
index rose by 46 % in 1974 and 24 % in 1975, both of which have combined
o
to increase labour unrest . The only relieving feature in the picture is that
unemployment has remained low, totalling 3 % of the labour force at the end
of 1975, but this is changing in 1976 and the rate is expected to double by
the end of the year.
In sum, Israel' s economic development has been characterized by rapid
growth, fuelled by large capital inflows, a fast-growing and well-educated
labour force and high motivation. The underlying factors are likely to
continue to favour economic growth but at a slower rate than previously.
The actual time path of growth will be largely dependent on her security
position. The aftermath of the psychologically damaging 197 3 war, in con-
junction with the worldwide recession, has clearly illustrated the vulnerabili-
ty of the Israeli-economy. The speed with which the economy can move out
of its present trough will depend on world market conditions, the defence
needs imposed by her changing security position and the factor inflow
(especially aid from the USA), all of which are at least partly beyond her
control.
2. Israeli Trade Policy
Although Israel' s rapid development has been primarily conditioned by her
favourable factor endowments and has been strongly affected by exogenous
events, this is not to deny a role to Israeli government policy. One fifth of
GNP originates in the public sector, but this figure understates the pervasive
government influence on the economy. Government activity partly reflects
the ideology of the governing Labour party, oriented towards creating a
"welfare state" and promoting economic development along specific lines,
but is also due to the concrete conditions of mass immigration and capital
inflows which required government assistance to be absorbed into the
economy. Trade policy has been an area in which government intervention
has been especially strong.
Q
In 1975 160,000 workdays were lost in 124 strikes, compared with
50,000 workdays in 71 strikes in 1974.- 18 -
The development strategy initially adopted by Israel was aimed at maximizing
self-sufficiency. An import substitution strategy had some specifically
Israeli motivations, e. g. the Zionist emphasis on a return to the land and
Israel' s tenuous military position, but it was also in tune with prevailing
world opinion on development strategy. The nascent manufacturing sector was
heavily protected by quantitative restrictions on imports. Although financial
incentives were offered to exporters in the 1950s, the overvalued exchange
rate and high protection walls made production for the domestic market
more attractive to Israeli entrepreneurs. Protection may have been
necessary in the 1950s because Israeli industry could not compete on the
world market, partly because government policy was aimed at provision of
jobs, especially in development areas, rather than at maximizing productive
efficiency. Nevertheless, it was becoming clear by the late 1950s that import
substitution was proving unsuccessful at achieving one of its goals, i. e.
reduction of the trade deficit, and the government started to move towards
a more outward-oriented development strategy. Elements of this policy shift
were liberalization of some imports, increased financial incentives to
exporters, establishment of institutions to overcome the non-price obstacles
to exporting and, most important, an increased emphasis on the criterion of
export potential in allocating investment funds.
The policy debate between proponents of import substitution and of outward-
oriented development culminated in the 1962 New Economic Policy. The
major items in the NEP package were devaluation of the pound, from I£ 1.8 /
$ to I£ 3 / $, and the replacement of quotas by tariffs. The NEP reflected
an appreciation of the desirability of extending the outward-orientation
adopted in the late 1950s, which had had a positive effect on exports, but
more fundamentally it reflected the realization that autarchy had little to
offer Israel once full employment of domestic factors of production had been
achieved around 1960. Increased per capita output required further division
of labour, bur for a small country opportunities for specialization are limited
by the size of the market. Thus the only prospect for further economic
development in the 1960s was to shift from autarchic policies to increased
integration in the world economy.- 19 -
Somewhat ironically the period 1962-5 saw a reduction in the incentives
offered for production for export vis-a-vis production for the home market.
This was partly because the government ended export subsidies in the
(mistaken) belief that the devaluation would provide sufficient financial
incentive to exporters and partly because import liberalization was a slow
process. Between 1965 and 1967 the Israeli economy experienced a recession
as the government cut back domestic demand, with a principal aim of
encouraging exports. In 1966 export premia were reintroduced and indirect
subsidies to exports increased rapidly after 1966. A further incentive to
entrepreneurs to look to export markets was provided in 1968 when the
replacement of quotas by tariffs was completed and a programme of regular
tariff reductions was initiated. Between January 1968 and the end of 1971 the
nominal tariff on manufactured goods fell from 78 % to 21 % (Pomfret (1976),
Table VII).
Despite some pressures for protection, government policy has been increas-
ingly outward-oriented in the 1970s. The increasing trade deficit, started
by a rapid increase in imports during the 1968-72 boom and then fuelled by
rising import prices and defence imports in 197 3-4, led to some protective
measures; a defence levy on imports of 20 % (imposed in 1970 and raised
to 25 % in November 1973), an import deposit scherrie..(abolished early in
1974) and a six month freeze on imports of some consumer goods (starting
November 1974). Import-substitute producers also benefitted from the
frequent devaluations. Nevertheless, government policy was biassed against
producers for the domestic market (vis-a-vis exporters) in that tariff
reductions continued to occur at fairly regular intervals. Meanwhile
financial incentives to exporters were increased. Although the government
remained unconverted to a floating exchange rate, it attempted to bring the
Israeli pound into a less overvalued position by devaluing from I£ 4. 2 /
US $ to I£ 6 / US $ in November 1974 and by a 10 % devaluation in September
1975. In June 1975 a system of creeping devaluation was introduced where-
by the Israeli pound can be devalued by up to 2 % each month.
The trend in Israeli government policy has thus been to move from an initial
attempt at autarchy towards integration into the world economy. Although- 20 -
the trend was always in the same direction, the speed with which government
policy moved towards outward-orientation varied. In the 1950s entrepreneurs
were encouraged to produce for the home market because quantitative
restrictions on imports gave them considerable protection. In the late 1950s
export promotion became a more significant policy goal. After the 1962
devaluation there was a slackening of government activity in this field, but
the active promotion of exports was resumed in the later 1960s and has
continued in the 1970s.
3. Israel's Trade History
Israel has had a large trade deficit in every year of its existence. The size
of the deficit, although fluctuating greatly, showed only a slight upward
trend before the 1967 war, but since then it has increased rapidly, especially
since 197 3 (cf. Chart 1). The deficit has been covered by capital imports
and, until 197 3, Israel was actually able to increase her foreign reserves.
Nevertheless, a major policy goal has been reduction of the trade deficit in
order to reduce dependence on external sources of funds. This has become
especially urgent as the explosion of the deficit in the last few years has
occurred at a time when German reparations and restitution payments are
diminishing. In view of the increased absolute amounts involved, personal
donations from world Jewry will be unable to fill the gap and a continuing
increase in the trade deficit will only be possible if US aid increases.
Measures of the importance of foreign trade to the economy vary according
to whether import/GNP or export/GNP ratios are used. The ratio of total
imports of goods and services, valued at the formal exchange rate, to GNP
has fluctuated around a level of 40 %, the export/GNP ratio has been corre-
spondingly lower.
The structure of imports by economic destination has changed considerably
during Israel' s history. In the early 1950s, consumer and investment goods
each accounted for around 25 %, raw materials 40 - 45 % and fuel 10 % of
the total value of imports of goods. By 1974 consumer goods had fallen to
8 % and producer goods to 17 %, while fuel accounted for 15 % and raw- 21 -
Chart 1 - ISRAEL'S FOREIGN TRADE
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materials the remainder. Despite their changing economic destination, the
structure of imports by branch of origin has not changed much, at least at
a highly aggregated level, and industrial goods have continued to account for
g
around three fifths of the total . A further noteworthy trend is the rapid
relative increase of military imports since 1968.
The geographical distribution of imports by country of origin has shifted
towards an increased share of purchases from the EEC, primarily at the
expense of the USA. In 1949, 32 % of Israel' s imports came from the USA,
9 % from the U. K. and 32 % from the rest of Europe. By 1974 the U. S. share
had fallen to 18 % and Europe' s increased to 56 %, the EEC accounting for
47 %.
Between 1950 and 1970 Israel's exports, measured in current dollar prices,
increased by an annual average of 16.4 %. Although this rapid expansion was
insufficient to close Israel' s trade deficit, it represents a remarkable per-
formance . The time path of Israel' s export growth is illustrated in Chart 1.
The early years of Israel' s existence saw rapid growth from a low base,
followed by a period of relatively slow growth between 1954 and 1958. Between
1958 and 1963 an export boom took place which was especially prominent in
the industrial sector, where the main contributors to export growth were metal
manufactures, textiles and chemicals. Manufactured exports continued to
grow steadily after 1963, and a new boom took place between 1968 and 1972.
The leading products in this boom were skill-intensive goods like electrical
equipment and aircraft . The export boom came to an end in 197 3, but at
the time of writing it is unclear whether this signifies a downward shift in
Israel' s export growth trend or merely a temporary break.
q
In 1950 "articles wholly or mainly manufactured" accounted for 62 % of
commodity imports, whereas such articles (SITC 5-8, minus 667)
accounted for 56 % in 1974.
The comparable figures for the other export-oriented Asian semi-developed
economies are Hong Kong 7.7 %, South Korea 21.2 %, arid Taiwan 14. 1 %.
The average rate for LDCs was 4.7% and for developed market economies
8.0% (United Nations, Handbook of International Trade and Development
Statistics 1972, pp. 22-5)..
Export of aircraft increased from $ 6.1 million in 1969 to $ 35 million in
1974.- 23 -
The export structure inherited by Israel upon becoming independent was a
typical example of monoculture. In 1949 citrus fruits and juices accounted
for 67 % of Israel' s exports. In the industrial sector, polished diamonds
accounted for 19 % and other manufactured goods for 3 % of total exports.
Since 1949 citrus and diamonds have remained the major export earners, but
their relative importance has declined as exports of other industrial goods
has increased. In 1974 the latter accounted for slightly over 50 % of Israeli
exports.
The destination of Israeli exports has not changed in the same way as the
geographical distribution of her imports. The share of Europe has declined
at the expense of Asian and African countries, a trend closely related to the
changing commodity structure of Israeli exports, reflecting the U. K.' s
predominance as a market for "Jaffa" fruit and the LDCs' suitability as a
market for Israeli manufactured goods. In 1949 the share of Israeli exports
going to the U. K. was 54 % and to the rest of Europe 27 %, whereas in 1974
Europe took 53 % (the EEC 38 %); the U. S. A.' s share rose from 16 % to 17 %.
The above description of Israel' s manufactured export performance suggests
a close chronological parallel with the government' s policy towards exports.
The two boom periods of 1958-63 and 1968-72 coincided with the granting of
increased incentives to exporters, while the relatively slow export expansion
of the mid-1950s and 1963-5 occurred in times of little government encourage-
ment to exporters. In an attempt to test this hypothesis several authors have
attempted to estimate export supply functions for Israel. The exercise is
complicated by the need to use annual data and by the many methodological
problems, but the unanimous conclusion is that manufactured exports are
price responsive and have therefore been favourably incluenced by govern-
ment policies which increase the financial incentive to export. A more
important variable in determining Israel' s manufactured export performance
was her industrial growth, which may also be positively related to govern-
ment policy or indeed to previous export expansion (Pomfret (1976),
chapter 3.'5}..- 24 -
4. Summary and conclusions
Israel has experienced rapid economic growth and industrial development
since the founding of the state. She nevertheless has retained some character-
istics of developing countries in particular her reliance on aid and vulnerabil-
ity to external events, and can fairly be characterized as a semi-industrialized
country. The rapid economic growth has largely resulted from growth of
factor inputs> and government policy, although active, cannot be considered
a major determinant of that growth.
In the area of trade, the government started with a highly protectionist
policy and has continuously moved away from that position, first by removing
quantitative restrictions on imports and then by reducing tariffs. This policy
shift follows the dictates of trade policy for a small country and has helped
export growth. It may be conjectured that failure to follow outward-looking
policies would have hindered economic development. The agreement with the
EEC is clearly consistent with the desire for greater integration into the
world economy, but raises the question of whether Israel would be better
advised to continue making non-preferential tariff reductions.
Reduction of the trade deficit has always been a major policy objective in
Israel, and section 3 indicates that this issue is becoming even more acute.
The solution to this problem lies outside the scope of the present study,
depending primarily on the government' s demand management and exchange
rate policies as well as on the security situation. The existence of the
problem has, however, strong implications for this study, because any
adverse effects of the EEC agreement on Israel' s balance of trade will be
hard felt in the absence of an adequate balance of payments adjustment
mechanism.- 25 -
Chapter 4: The Institutional Background: The "Global Mediterranean
Policy" and Israel-EEC Relations
The 1975 agreement between Israel and the EEC is part of the latter' s
"Global Mediterranean Policy". The major economic goal of this policy is
the establishment of a free trade area covering the Mediterranean area and
the EEC. This will be first achieved with respect to manufactured goods and
the EEC-Israel agreement is the first step towards this goal. The present
chapter surveys first the historical development of the EEC s Mediterranean
policy, including its effects on factor flows and on third countries, and then
the specific relations between the EEC and Israel.
1. The Mediterranean Policy of the EEC
Since its inception the EEC has established a network of preferential trading
and financial arrangements with developing countries. An intended consequence
of this policy was to mitigate and compensate for the adverse effects on these
countries' economies of the trade diversion resulting from the establishment
of the EEC . Especially hard hit among the developing countries were those
along the Mediterranean littoral whose trade was dominated by the EEC and
who relied heavily on exports of goods protected under the common agricultural
policy. Further reasons for special relationships between the EEC and Medi-
terranean countries were the desire of some of the latter for eventual EEC
membership and the significant geo-political position of the Mediterranean
for European security.
For a discussion of the aims of the EEC s trade policies towards developiog
countries see Donges (1974). Analysis of the effects of this policy is
contained in Kreinin (1975).- 26 -
Agreements with Mediterranean Countries 1962-72
The first Mediterranean country to reach an agreement with the EEC was
Greece. The Treaty of Association signed in July 1962 provided for (a) the
establishment of a customs union during a transition period of between twelve
and twenty-two years, (b) financial assistance from the EEC, (c) harmoniza-
tion of economic policies, (d) the establishment of common institutions,
(e) the possibility of Greek membership of the EEC if and when Greek
economic conditions made this feasible. After the Greek coup d' etat of 1967
the EEC unilaterally froze the Treaty of Association.
In September 1963 a similar Treaty of Association was signed with Turkey.
This differed from the Greek agreement in two significant ways. Full member-
ship received much less emphasis and the institutional links established
between the EEC and Turkey were fewer than with Greece. The phases
through which EEC-Turkish relations must go before full association was
achieved were more clearly spelt out than in the Greek case. Both of these
differences stemmed from Turkey' s more backward economy, as did the
higher level of financial assistance granted to Turkey. In 1972 adjustments
to the Treaty of Association were negotiated and a new agreement was signed
in June 1973, which made no reference to future full membership. In
January 1973 the final twelve year transition phase to full association was
begun.
Morocco and Tunisia signed partial association agreements in 1969, which
were to run for five years. Both agreements concerned mutual tariff
concessions with immediate effect on EEC tariffs and deferred for the two
associated countries. In December 1970 an association agreement was
signed with Malta, under which full association was to be reached over two
five-year stages. A similar agreement was signed with Cyprus in December
1972. None of these association agreements envisaged accession to the
EEC.
In addition to association agreements based on Article 238 .of the Treaty of
Rome, the EEC has concluded a number of preferential trade agreements- 27 -
(PTAs) with Mediterranean countries based on Article 113. The first of
these were signed in June 1970 with Spain and Israel, with Spain receiving
more advantageous terms. They contained preferences concerning the ex-
change of both agricultural and industrial products, but the emphasis was
on the latter. The PTAs could have been expected to have a favourable
effect on Spanish and Israeli exports, but their value was reduced by the
Generalized System of Preferences for developing countries (GSP), which
was introduced by the EEC in July 1971, and the enlargement of the EEC
in January 1973. Further PTAs were signed in December 1972 with
Lebanon and Egypt.
A non-preferential agreement granting most favoured nation status was
signed with Yugoslavia in March 1970. Closer ties between the EEC and
Yugoslavia are expected in a new agreement covering financial aid and
migrant labour as well as granting preferential trade treatment. The EEC s
relations with Yugoslavia are of exceptional interest in view of that country' s
socio-economic system, and many other socialist countries are studying the
case carefully with an eye on their own future relations with the EEC. For
the purposes of the present st_udy, however, Yugoslavia' s economic
structure makes her something of a special case and she will be omitted
from consideration.
The Genesis of a Global Mediterranean Policy
By 197 2 the EEC had agreements with almost all of the Mediterranean
countries. Although Algeria and Syria had no formal agreements, it was
agreed by both parties that agreements should be concluded. Only Albania
and Libya showed no interest in a special relationship.
The plethora of agreements established a complex system of relationships
rather than a consistent policy on the part of the EEC. The complexity led
to net discrimination against some of the Mediterranean countries whose
closest competitors received more favourable treatment. The desire for a
more unified policy reflected not only the anomalies of the existing patchwork- 28 -
of agreements, but also the feeling that the Mediterranean Basin constituted
a distinct geo-political and economic entity (despite the Greek-Turkish and
Arab-Israeli tensions) which should be treated as a whole.
In 1970/1 the first demands for a global Mediterranean policy (GMP) came
from the European Parliament. Discussion of the concept was confused at first,
but since autumn 1972 the Commission and the Council of the EEC have
been engaged in a substantive dialogue over the GMP. The political and
security aspects of the GMP are still uncertain, indeed it is debated whether
the GMP should have any political components or whether it should consist
solely of economic measures.
The economic component of the GMP is relatively clearly conceived. The goal
is a free trade area covering the whole Mediterranean littoral and the EEC.
So far as EEC imports are concerned this can be rapidly achieved for industrial
goods, but several members are unwilling to permit large-scale imports of
goods covered by the Common Agricultural Policy and implementation of a
free trade area in these products will be a slower process. This reduces the
attractiveness of the GMP for most of the Mediterranean countries, since their
exports are dominated by agricultural goods. Furthermore, they are at an
early stage of industrialization and are therefore unwilling to grant reverse
preferences on manufactured goods. The EEC countries recognize this problem
and are prepared to grant financial and technical aid to the Mediterranean
countries in order to accelerate the industrialization process and make the
prospect of an industrial free trade area more realistic.
The first application of a GMP was the negotiations with the Maghreb countries
which started in 1972. Since the early 1960s Algeria had enjoyed a privileged
position vis-a-vis the EEC, but it was becoming increasingly felt that the
situation should be based on a formal agreement rather than on a regime of
semi-legality. Negotiations towards such an agreement were started in July
1972. Since the association agreements with the other Maghreb countries,
Morocco and Tunisia, were due for renewal in 1974, it appeared opportune to
approach the Maghreb problems in a comprehensive fashion. It was hoped to- 29 -
sign agreements simultaneously with the Maghreb countries and Israel and
then to move on to negotiations with the Mashraq countries (Egypt, Jordan,
Lebanon and Syria), thus concluding a systematic pattern of relationships
with all the southern Mediterranean countries. Progress with the Maghreb
countries was, however, slow, primarily because of the need to make specific
arrangements for agricultural products.
In 1974 and 1975 the GMP was pushed along by events in Greece, Portugal and
Spain which forced the EEC to reconsider its relations with these countries.
After the fall of the military regime in 1974, the Greek government quickly
tried to improve relationships with the EEC and in June 1975 lodged a formal
application for full membership. The response of the EEC Commission was
long delayed and represented only a cautious approval of the request, but it
is clear that closer relationships can be expected. In Spain and Portugal too
political change has removed a major obstacle to closer links with the EEC.
Negotiations over Spain' s PTA were broken off in October 1975 after executions
of Basque separatists. Since Franco' s death, however, the way is open not
only for a revival of negotiations, but also for proper association and eventual
full membership. Portugal, as an EFTA member, has had a free trade agree-
ment with the EEC since January 1973, and she hoped to improve its terms
after the April 1974 revolution. This hope has as yet remained unfulfilled
because of Italian and French opposition to easier EEC access for Portuguese
agricultural goods. Despite some reservations over political trends in
Portugal, the EEC has expressed its desire for closer ties and showed its
goodwill by granting financial aid in October 1975.
In July 1975 a far-reaching trade agreement was signed with Israel. The terms
had been agreed by the end of 1974 but formal signing was delayed in anti-
cipation of a Maghreb agreement. In some ways autumn 1975 was the low
point of the GMP; after three years the only concrete achievement was the
agreement with Israel. In December 1975 a further small piece of the GMP
fell in place as a new association agreement, including substantial financial
aid, was signed with Malta.- 30 -
The real breakthrough came in January 1976 when the Maghreb negotiations
were brought to a successful conclusion. The trade clauses of Morocco and
Tunisia' s PTAs were improved and Algeria received a formal PTA, with
special provisions for wine and petroleum products. Financial aid of 339
million units of account (almost $ 350 m.) was granted to the three countries
and improved social security was guaranteed to migrant Maghreb labour in
the EEC. A compromise was reached regarding the Arab boycott of companies
trading with Israel, according to which the Maghreb countries' undertaking
not to discriminate between EEC countries, companies or citizens was sub-
ject to national security imperatives.
After the conclusion of the Maghreb agreement the EEC moved quickly into
the next stage of the GMP. Negotiations with Egypt were opened in January
1976 and Jordan, Lebanon and Syria were to follow in February. For the
first time the GMP had become truly global.
A Taxonomy of EEC - Mediterranean Agreements
The long-term economic goal of the GMP is the establishment of a free trade
area, but it is recognized that this cannot be achieved immediately. The
speed with which the various Mediterranean countries will move towards a
free-trade relationship with the EEC depends critically on their relative
level of economic development. Since per capita income varies greatly be-
tween these countries, it is not surprising that the existing agreements differ
widely in the extent to which they approach a free-trade situation.
Two aspects of the EEC - Mediterranean agreements can be identified:
(1) non-trade-related articles and (2) preferential trade arrangements. The
former consist of institutional arrangements and of financial and technical
assistance to hasten the economic development of the Mediterranean country.
The latter consist of direct preferences granted by the EEC and reverse
preferences for EEC exports. The various agreements can thus be
characterized by the extent to which they contain the following:- 31 -
1 a Institutional arrangements
b Financial and technical assistance
2 a Direct preferences: (i) on industrial goods
(ii) on agricultural goods
b Reverse preferences: (i) on industrial goods
(ii) on agricultural goods.
Substantial institutional arrangements are only included in the agreements
with those European countries which have shown an interest in eventual
membership.
For the less developed Mediterranean countries lb and 2a (ii) are most
important. They have few manufactured exports and are not interested in
2
granting reverse preferences . Since the EEC is reticent in offering con-
cessions regarding agricultural goods (especially those competing with
Italian and French products) and since the offer of financial and technical
assistance seldom matches the LDC s expectations, negotiations with these
countries entail hard bargaining and yield idiosyncratic conclusions. The
Malta negotiations, for example, were frustrated for several months because
the Maltese rejected the EEC offer of 21 million units of account (u.a.) in
financial aid as inadequate while the EEC considered Malta' s request for
31 m. u.a. unreasonable. There was no jointly accepted principle by which
a "fair" decision could be reached. A compromise sum of 26 m. u.a. was
finally agreed upon. The Maghreb negotiations were also stymied by the
need to agree on figures in cases where the parties' interests were directly
opposed. With Tunisia the stumbling block was olive oil - a major export
which competes directly with Italian olive oil. In Algeria' s case the problem
was wine. The clauses concerning Algerian wine in the final agreement
illustrate the horsetrading which takes place over goods covered by the CAP:
Algerian wine is to be admitted to the EEC at 80 % of the common wine
2
Evidence from countries covered by the Yaounde
1 Convention of 1961
suggests that reverse preferences offered by LDCs to the EEC lead only
to trade diversion and a welfare loss for the LDC (Kreinin (1973)). Thus
the attitude of the least developed Mediterranean countries towards
reverse preferences is completely rational.- 32 -
tariff, providing minimum import price provisions are respected and subject
to a quota limit on quality wines (252, 000 hectolitres in the first year, rising
to 450, 000 hectolitres in the fifth year). Similar hard bargaining over figures
can be expected in the Mashraq negotiations, and it makes these agreements
very difficult to analyze for general conclusions.
The semi-industrial countries are more interested in obtaining direct pre-
ferences on manufactured exports ( 2ai), because their growing industrial
3
sector can benefit from such concessions . They are also interested in lb
and 2aii because the agricultural sector is still important, but these compo-
nents of an agreement are not as critical as they are for the LDCs. The EEC
countries expect reverse preferences to be granted by the semi-industrial
countries, who are reluctant to expose their domestic producers to EEC
competition immediately but recognize the desirability of ultimate exposure.
Negotiations with semi-industrial countries tend therefore to go more smooth-
ly than with LDCs. This has been obscured in the cases of Greece and Spain
by political considerations and more recently by the complication of agreeing
on a timetable for full membership. The Israel negotiations, however, went
relatively smoothly. The EEC has granted free access to almost all Israeli
industrial products by 1977, while the Israele market will be opened by stages
to EEC industrial exports with complete free trade by 1989 at the latest. Al-
though the scheduling of the dismantling of Israeli tariffs required bargaining,
the degree of conflict was reduced because the goal of achieving free trade in
industrial goods in the foreseeable future was shared. The hard bargaining
was reserved for agricultural products and the precise concessions to be
granted to imports from Israel.
3
The experience of the 1960s supports the contention that countries'
responses to preferences on manufactured goods offered by developed
countries is directly related to their level of industrialization. While
the Yaounde countries benefitted little from EEC preferences, Portuguese
exports responded vigorously to EFTA preferences. Of the two associate
members of the EEC total exports and the share of exports going to the
EEC increased in Greece, the more highly industrialized and rapidly
developing associate, and decreased in Turkey (cf. chapter 5.1 below).- 33 -
The clarity of the goal and the proximity of its realization with respect to
some countries make the industrial free trade area the most interesting
aspect of the GMP for economic analysis. Although the industrial free trade
area is only of immediate interest to a minority of the Mediterranean countries,
it is of potential importance to all. The technical and financial aid and agri-
cultural concessions which are currently so crucial to the Mediterranean
LDCs are primarily means to an end, and when the end of industrial develop-
ment is achieved the transition to free trade in industrial goods will be an
important step. The experience of today' s semi-industrialized countries will
reveal the potential benefits and costs of this step.
2. Factor Movements between the EEC and the Mediterranean
The GMP has concentrated primarily on trade relations. Various agreements
have contained provisions for aid and regarding social security for migrant
labour, but otherwise the GMP has not dealt with factor flows. In the past
labour movements between the Mediterranean countries and the EEC have
been important, while capital flows have been limited. These patterns may
change in future as both labour and capital mobility increases and some labour
movements are replaced by capital flows. An important question is the extent
to which future factor movements will be affected by the GMP.
Large scale labour migration from the Mediterranean to the EEC began in
1960. In the late 1950s labour movements primarily took place within the
EEC, with unskilled labour reserves coming from sout_hern Italy, but after
1960 the EEC countries began to attract labour from almost the whole
Mediterranean area. According to official statistics there were over 5
million migrant workers living in the EEC member countries in 1973. These
figures underestimate the magnitude of the phenomenon, however, because
they omit illegal flows which are undoubtedly large.
Direct foreign investment in the region, by non-EEC as well as EEC companies,
was extremely limited until the late 1960s and was concentrated in the
petroleum sector. Direct investments from the eight leading home countries
(USA, UK, W. Germany, France, Switzerland, Italy, Netherlands and
Belgium) totalled $5.6 billion at the end of 1967; $1.9 billion was in the- 34 -
manufacturing sector, of which $1.2 billion took place in Spain and $ 0. 3
billion in Greece. In sum, foreign investment in industry in the 1960s primarily
concerned Spain and to a much smaller extent Greece, with little impact on the
other Mediterranean countries. By the end of 1973 the aggregate figure had
increased from $ 5. 6 billion to $ 7. 2 billion and, although a sectoral break-
down is unavailable, Spain and the petroleum producing countries retained a
dominant position as recipients. The insignificance of the Mediterranean area
in the global plans of multinational corporations (MUCOs) operating in the
manufacturing sector is revealed by the fact that only 3. 5 % of the total book
value of US corporations' overseas investments in 1973 was in this region,
although these corporations are the biggest investors in the area.
There are some signs that the pattern of factor movements began to change
during the economic crisis of 1973-5. In the EEC industrial heartland there
has been an increased resistance to continuing large-scale inflows of labour
from the Mediterranean region. This is primarily a social and political issue,
but it has an economic aspect too insofar as obsolete industries can prolong
their existence by using immigrant labour, with possibly detrimental effect on
international competitiveness. It can be expected that the reduced labour flow
from the Mediterranean area to the EEC will be accompanied by an increased
capital flow in the reverse direction, especially in industries with low skill
requirements. Capital within the EEC, both indigenous firms and non-EEC
MUCOs, is also coming under additional pressures to relocate its activities,
e.g., stricter environmental control, decreasing willingness of indigenous
labour to undertake monotonous work, increases trade union militancy, etc. .
At the same time, it is gradually becoming easier to export from LDCs to the
EEC, although there are pressure groups within the EEC continually trying to
restrict imports from LDCs. Whether MUCOs will decide to invest in the
Mediterranean area rather than in other low wage countries will depend on
many factors, mostly internal to the individual countries. Of critical importance
are government attitudes to foreign investment and the degree of political
stability. In general, the non-Arab countries have followed an open-door policy
towards MUCOs while the Arab countries have been hostile. There is evidence- 35 -
that some of the Arab countries are changing their stand - most dramatically
in Tunisia' s radical policy change in 1972 and in Sadat' s move towards the
West since 1973.
The significance of the GMP in this context is that EEC tariff concessions tilt
the balance further in favour of locating export-oriented direct foreign invest-
ment in the Mediterranean area. Studies of direct foreign investment in other
parts of the world show that it is responsive to variations in factor prices. If
the investment is export-oriented then it should respond to inter-country
variations in export prices just as much as to variations in input prices. The
important question is whether the price advantage given to the producer located
in a Mediterranean country by the GMP is sufficient to affect the investment
location decision of MUCOs.
3. The Attitude of Third Countries
The agreements between the EEC and the Mediterranean countries are almost
all in violation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Most
Favoured Nation Principle and all discriminate against third countries' exports.
The discrimination against non-participating LDCs was partially alleviated by
the introduction of the EEC s Generalized System of Preferences in 1971, but
these countries still enjoy less favourable access to EEC markets than the
Mediterranean countries with EEC agreements. The industrialized countries
enjoy no offsetting preferences and undoubtedly the largest sufferer from the
trade diversion caused by the EEC s formation, enlargement and preferential
trading agreements has been the USA. Unlike other third countries the USA
has considerable power to influence the EEC and Mediterranean countries, and
also to retaliate against their commercial policies if it so desires. This section
will consider the US attitude and possible reaction to the GMP, in particular
as it effects Israel.
The US attitude was favourable towards the founding of the EEC. Although it
was clear that the EEC would harm outsiders' exports (and ex post empirical
studies have borne this out), the USA was prepared to pay this price in order
to see a politically strong western Europe. The American government limited
itself on the economic side to encouraging a liberal policy from the EEC; it- 36 -
criticized the Common Agricultural Policy, pressured for a lower Common
External Tariff and argued against special association agreements. The last
feature was, however, not greatly stressed in the 1960s and indeed the US
attitude to Greek association was distinctly favourable, because of the
perceived political advantages of assisting an exposed NATO member.
The US government was lukewarm towards the enlargement of the EEC. The
increase from six to nine members reduced the political cohesiveness of the
Community. Furthermore, the trade diversion resulting from enlargement
and the free trade area with the non-acceding EFTA countries was expected
4
to be large; the loss in US industrial exports was estimated at $ 2000 million .
Finally, the number of preferential trading relations with the EEC was in-
creased by the special arrangements made for British Commonwealth countries.
There were, however, no grounds for protesting against either enlargement
or the free trade area, because these arrangements are not in contravention
to GATT' s MEN rule. Thus US policy was directed towards encouraging a
more liberal EEC policy towards outsiders and disputing those special
arrangements which do not conform to GATT.
Although the USA objects to all preferential agreements with the EEC, it is
5
especially opposed to the granting of reverse preferences to the EEC . In
the 1970s the USA has taken steps to retaliate against countries which do
offer reverse preferences, and the 1973 Trade Reform Act denied American
GSP treatment to LDCs discriminating against US exports. The EEC has
responded by weakening its demands for reverse preferences from African
4
Kreinin (1973b), but the methodology of this study has been criticized for
leading to upward-biassed estimates (Clague (1976)).
The reasons for this are threefold: (i) direct preferences can be claimed
to support economic development and would thus be likely to qualify for
GATT waivers, (ii) the EEC and USA are close competitors in manufactured
goods, whereas the recipients of direct preferences are generally not
directly competitive with the USA, (iii) the level of protection in LDCs is
generally higher than in the EEC and the benefits from preferential access
is correspondingly greater (Kreinin (1976), p. 40).- 37 -
countries, e.g. in the Lome
1 Convention of 1975, and now insists on them only
from the more advanced Mediterranean countries. Thus, in contrast to its
favourable attitude to Greek association, the USA became increasingly hostile
to the EEC s Mediterranean policy during the 1970s.
The economic bases of the changing US attitude towards the EEC
5 s Mediterranean
policy are easy to define. In both the Greek and Turkish markets the US share
declined in the 1960s - in Greece from 11.7 % (1959-61) to 7.4 % (1969-71) and
in Turkey from 22 % (1959) to 12 % (1971) - and this can, at least in part, be
attributed to the association agreements (in both cases the EEC market share
increased). In the Greek case, this was offset by increased total trade due to
the industrial expansion following the association (Kalamatousakis (1976)). The
major reason for US equanimity towards this trade diversion was the relatively
small size of US exports to Greece and Turkey. The major share of US
Mediterranean exports goes to Spain and Israel, $ 972 million and $558 million
respectively in 1972, compared to $ 250 million to Greece and $ 300 million
to Turkey (Kreinin (1976), p. 47), and it was the 1970 preferential trading
agreements with these two countries, both involving reverse preferences, which
increased US hostility to the GMP.
Isreal is particularly vulnerable to retaliatory action by the USA. Although the
EEC as a whole is a more important market for Israel than the USA is, the
latter receives almost a fifth of Israel' s industrial exports. Negotiations are
currently taking place between Israel and the USA concerning easier access
for Israeli exports to US markets. If the USA continues to follow a hard line
vis-a-vis trading partners who have offered preferential access to exports
from other developed countries, then, in spite of the special US-Israeli
relationship, Israel' s EEC agreement may have a harmful effect on her ex-
ports to the USA.
1. Israel and the EEC
Israel
1 s major trading partner, ever since the formation of the state, has
been western Europe. In many ways western Europe is her "natural" export
market: (a) since the Arab world is closed to Israeli goods, Europe is Israel' s- 38 -
closest market geographically, (b) climatic differences ensure that Israel' s
agricultural products are either not produced or can only be produced at a
different time of the year in most of Europe, (c) the high standards of living
in western Europe lead to demand for the type of high quality manufactured
goods in which Israel has a comparative advantage. In 1957 Israel' s exports
to the alx signatories of the Rome Treaty amounted to $ 30 m. (of which
industrial goods other than diamonds accounted for $ 6 m.) and to the UK
$ 28 m. ($ 8 m.) out of a total of $ 141 m. ($ 50 m.). In 1973 exports to the
Six were $ 410 m, (industrial goods excluding diamonds, $ 150 m.) and to the
three new members of the EEC $ 149 m. ($ 92 m.) out of a total of $ 1449 m.
($ 659 m.).
Israel recognized the importance of the Rome Treaty and was one of the first
countries to open diplomatic relations with the EEC . Israel requested a trade
agreement in 1960 and negotiations were opened in 1962, but they only led to
a commercial agreement of a non-preferential nature (i..e. all concessions
were automatically granted to Israel' s competitors). The agreement, signed
in 1964, reduced the CET on some industrial goods of interest to Israel, but
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only by 20 % . Israel was dissatisfied with the 1964 agreement and pressed
for a new agreement, but progress was slow, in particular because of French
opposition. When the agreement expired in 1967 Israel did not even make a
request for renewal. The EEC, still unwilling to negotiate a new agreement,
continued to apply the 1964 concessions, but they were now worth even less
o
than before . Finally, a political compromise was reached among the Six
For a description of the relationship between Israel and the EEC in the
1960s see Minerbi (1970).
The 1964 agreement has been caustically described as consisting "of a
series of technical manipulations, some of only temporary effect, in
Community tariffs with only one really substantive concession - on grape-
fruit". (Henig (1976), p. 313).
Q
Concessions based on national accelerations towards CET were meaningless
now that the CET was about to come into force and the grapefruit concession
had been consolidated in the Kennedy Round.- 39 -
after the French government announced in 1969 that it was in favour of a
preferential trade agreement (PTA) with Israel on condition that a PTA would
be granted to any Arab country which requested it. The PTA with Israel was
signed in June 1970.
In the situation of the 1960s when Israel had no PTA with the EEC, the
existence of the EEC had a negative effect on Israeli exports. Although the
CET was generally lower than the national tariffs which it replaced, it gave
EEC producers an advantage over third parties in the other member countries
as well as their own. Furthermore the various association agreements signed
in the 1960s gave several non-member countries better access to the EEC
markets than Israel enjoyed, It has been estimated that the foreign exchange
cost for Israel of this tariff discrimination on industrial goods was equivalent
to about 5 % of her manufactured exports excluding diamonds (Kreinin (1968),
p. 308). A further cost of tariff discrimination and the uncertainty associated
with the continuing Israel-EEC negotiations was the adverse effect on foreign
investment in Israel. Dynamic effects resulting from the reduced exports
and investment are less calculable, but would include reduced realization of
scale economies.
The preferential trade agreement between Israel and the EEC took effect in
October 1970 and was to run for five years. The major provision concerning
Israel' s manufactured exports was a 50 % cut in the CET of which 30 %• was
immediate and thereafter 5 % on each January 1st. On certain "sensitive"
products the reduction was less than 50 %, e.g. aluminium goods (34 %) and
automobiles (28 %). A negative list specified exceptions on which there would
9
be no reduction in the CET . Israel' s 1968 exports to the EEC of reduced
industrial goods were $ 38 m., compared to $ 5 m. of goods on the negative
list. Some industrial goods were excluded from the agreement because they
clashed with the Community' s agricultural policy (especially products of the
g
The most important items on the negative list were bromine, phosphoric
acid, phosphates, superphosphates, citric acid, PVC, plywood, cotton
yarn not ready for retail sales, stockings, knitwear, window glass, iron
and steel pipes.- 40 -
food industry) and some goods were not affected because their CET was zero.
Although the concessions granted to Israel were inferior to those granted in
bilateral agreements to Greece, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey and also in the
PTA signed with Spain, it could be expected that they would provide a signifi-
cant stimulus to Israel' s industrial exports.
The major problem in evaluating the effect of the 1970 PTA is that Israeli
exporters faced an uncertain world trade situation in the early 1970s. The
decline of the dollar, and hence of the Israeli pound, vis-a-vis the major
European economies provided a further reason for Israeli exporters to look
to Europe, but this was partly offset by the presence of commercial nego-
tiations between Israel and the USA which made Israeli entrepreneurs unwilling
to burn their American bridges. Furthermore, the shift in the EEC tariff
structure in Israel' s favour in 1970 was offset by two events in the early 1970s
which harmed Israel' s position. In July 1971 the EEC implemented a unilateral
Generalized System of Preferences for developing countries. Under this sys-
tem industrial exports of 91 LDCs and 47 so-called "dependent territories"
enjoy zero tariff, subject only to an upper quota limit. Since Israel is not
included in the GSP, her competitive position vis-a-vis producers of industrial
goods who are included in the GSP (e. g. Hong Kong, Singapore, Yugoslavia,
Mexico) has worsened. The enlargement of the EEC in January 1973 by the
accession of Denmark, Eire and the UK harmed non-EEC members, because
the newcomers' tariffs were on average lower than the CET. This was
especially hard for Israel since the UK was her second largest export market
(behind the USA). Increased UK tariffs on industrial goods would only affect
a few commodities (the increase would be most felt by agricultural exports
and by the food industry) but some of these industrial goods are important for
Israel, e. g. plywood, bromine, phosphoric acid, bromides and superphosphates .
Plywood was an especially important case for Israel as this had been one
of her leading manufactured exports since the 1950s and the main market
was the UK. In 1972 Israel' s plywood exports amounted to $ 6.4 m., of
which $ 5. 1 m. went to the UK. The UK' s entry to the EEC meant that the
tariff had to go up from 5 % to 13 %, while at the same time Gabon, one of
Israel' s competitors in the plywood market, would enjoy duty free access
as an associate member of the EEC .- 41 -
When the 1970 PTA was signed, the Israeli government saw it as the first stage
in a process of trade liberalization between Israel and the EEC. The unfavour-
able events of 1971-2 made the renegotiation of the PTA an immediate Israeli
policy goal. The framework within which this renegotiation would take place
was set by the EEC
J s adoption in 1972 of a "Mediterranean Policy", which
aimed at the creation of a free trade area in manufactured goods in the whole
Mediterranean area. An Israel-EEC protocol was signed in January 1973 to
the effect that a new agreement would be signed and come into force by 1st
January 1974. This timetable was not respected, but the UK prevented any
adverse effects on Israel by refusing to implement her first adjustment to the
CET until agreement was reached. Despite much haggling over the time
permitted for Israel to remove her tariffs on industrial goods and over the
provisions regarding Israeli access to finance and regarding agricultural and
food industry products, an agreement was finally reached in December 1974
and signed in May 1975. The Agreement came into force on 1st July 1975.
Under the 1975 agreement Israeli manufactured exports, including processed
agricultural products, will enjoy duty free access to the EEC by 1st July 1977.
EEC tariffs were reduced by 60 % on 1st July 1975 and 20 % on 1st January
1976, and the final 20 % reduction will come into force on 1st July 1977.
Certain "sensitive" imports from Israel will be subject to quotas or other
restrictions for some time, but all these must terminate by the end of 1979.
Tariffs will be retained on Israel' s agricultural exports, although 85 % of these
exports will enjoy tariff reductions, mostly of not less than 50 %. There are
also controls (minimum prices, quotas or voluntary restraint) on some
agricultural products.
The reverse preferences granted by Israel will also lead to free trade in
manufactured goods, but Israel' s tariff dismantlement will be slower than that
of the EEC and specific provision was made for infant industry protection. For
some 60 % of EEC exports to Israel tariff reduction began on 1st July 1975
and tariff-free entry will be achieved by 1st January 1980. For other products
the first tariff reduction will take place on 1st July 1977 and tariff dismantle-
ment will in principle be completed by 1st January 1985, but this timetablemay be modified. Israel also has the option of increasing customs duties by
up to 20 % to protect infant industries; these duties may not cover more than
10 % of manufactured imports and must all be abolished by 1st January 1989
at the latest. Quantitative restrictions on imports are to be abolished; 95 %
of Israel' s imports from EEC are already quota free and the remaining 5 %
are to be freed between 1980 and 1985.
The 1975 agreement, unlike earlier EEC - Israel agreements, covers technical
cooperation. This includes provisions for the exchange of know-how and
possible participation by Israel in scientific and technological activities be-
tween the EEC and other non-member states. The agreement makes no pro-
vision for financial cooperation, although an exchange of letters allowed for
the possibility of future Israeli access to EEC financial institutions.
The present study focusses on one aspect of the 1975 agreement: the proposed
free trade area in manufactured goods. The effects of the free trade area will
be compared to the effects of continuing the present trade regime, and the
implications of the implementation procedure will receive only subordinate
attention. Since Israel is a minor supplier of manufactured products to the
EEC, the effects on the EEC economies will be small and can be disregarded
for most industrial branches. The "small country" assumption does not apply
to Israel' s agricultural exports, most of which have a significant market
share in the EEC and compete directly with EEC producers. For this reason
and because the terms of the 1975 agreement are less clearcut for non-
industrial products, these goods will not be dealt with.PART TWO
THE EFFECTS ON ISRAEL OF FREE TRADE
IN MANUFACTURED GOODS
WITH THE EEC- 43 -
Chapter 5: The Direct Trade Effects
The direct effects of a free trade area with the EEC on Israel's trade in
manufactured goods are estimated in this chapter. The general analytical
framework is that laid down in chapters 1 and 2. In particular, it should
be recalled that Israel is assumed to face infinitely elastic external demand
and supply curves at the world price and her import demand can be fully
satisfied by the EEC at this price. Tertiary effects, i.e. changes in trade
flows resulting from measures to restore balance of payments equilibrium,
are ignored. The estimates in this chapter are short-run in nature, ignoring
changes in factor endowments which result from the agreement, and are
limited to a comparison of the full preference and no preference situations.
The analysis is undertaken at a macro-economic level and yields orders of
magnitude which must not be considered precise estimates.
A survey of ex post studies of agreements similar to that between Israel
and the EEC is presented in the first section. These studies are not very-
satisfactory, but their conclusions offer some points for comparison with
our estimates. The theory of preference-induced trade effects has advanced
tremendously in the last decade and a summary of the methodological issues
is given in the second section. This is followed by the ex ante estimates of
the trade effects on Israel of free trade in manufactured goods with the EEC.
The final section summarizes the results and presents some conclusions.- 44 -
1. Evidence on the Trade Effects of Preferences offered by European
Trading Blocs to Other Countries
The estimates of the trade effects of the 1975 Israel-EEC agreement are of
an ex ante nature. There is no possibility to use extrapolations of the conse-
quences of previous EEC-Israel agreements. It would, however, be useful
to examine how similar agreements have worked out in practice, although
clearly the quantitative results will depend on the specific preferences grant-
ed and characteristics of the country involved.
Overall evaluations of the benefits of association and preference agreements
are mixed. A comprehensive study of such agreements with the EEC concluded
that:
"Die Beurteilung der Assoziierungs- und Praferenzpolitik der
Europaischen Gemeinschaft hat zusammenfassend fur die 8e-
giinstigten Staaten kaum erkennbare praferenzbedingte Verbes-
serungen ihrer Exportposition ergeben" (Loch and Hasenpflug
(1974), p. 132).
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Kreinin, however, has reached the conflicting conclusion that the Yaounde
countries made some small gains, and that Greece and Portugal made more
considerable gains from preferences offered by the EEC and EFTA (Kreinin
(1975), p. 363). The problem with these conclusions is that the primary
research upon which they are based consists of comparing aggregate import
and export growth rates from before and after {he agreement of of comparing
the performance of individual commodities from preferred and non-preferred
sources, both of which are imperfect proxies for the relevant comparison
between a country's trade balance with or without the preferences, ceteris
paribus. In order to get behind the general conclusions it may be worthwhile
to examine in greater detail some of the more relevant cases. Since we are
here interested in a semi-developed country's trade in manufactured goods,
"The assessment of the EEC's association and preference policy has
indicated scarcely any discernible improvements in the favoured nations'
exports due to preferences" (present author's translation).- 45 -
we will not consider the experience of the non-European countries which are
mainly concerned with preferences on agricultural goods and raw materials.
Portugals position as the least developed member of EFTA placed her in a
situation in the 1960s similar to that which Israel will occupy vis-a-vis the
EEC in the forthcoming decade. Although EFTA countries had removed al-
most all duties on Portugal's manufactured exports by 1967, most of Portugal's
import duties were subject to a slower timetable so that only a third of her
imports from EFTA were duty free and the remainder still faced 60 % of the
basic duties. The effects of EFTA membership on Portuguese exports are
suggested by the fact that the share going to EFTA countries increased from
20.8 % in 1962 to 35.4 % in 1970 while the share destined for more rapidly
growing areas, e. g. the EEC, declined. An attempt to quantify the trade
effects of EFTA preferences for 1967 found that:
"the total import effects amounted to $ 32 million and the total
export effects to $ 113 million, so that the Portuguese balance
of trade benefitted by $ 95 million" (EFTA (1972), p. 94).
Apart from the simple arithmetical error which has increased the net effect
from $ 81 m. to $ 95 m., there are two reasons for believing this to be an
overestimate. Due to data unavailability less than half of Portuguese manu-
factured output is covered by the analysis and the excluded sectors were
considered to be more likely to have shown substantial import effects than
export effects. Secondly, the size of the net trade effect was only $ 31 m. in
1965 and $ 34 m. in 1966. The methodology of the study is to ascribe any
divergence from extrapolated pre-EFTA import and export trends to "EFTA
effects", but such a large and sudden movement away from the trends so long
after EFTA's inception suggests that other forces were at work in 1SS7. The
heavy sectoral and geographical concentration of Portugal's 1967 "EFTA
effects" reinforces the impression that specific factors, not directly related
2
to preferences, were responsible.. The overall conclusion is that, while the
Exports of textiles and clothing accounted for 80 % of the 1967 export effects
and the "import effects were mainly concentrated on two commodity groups,
textiles and passenger cars"; 62 % of the import effects and 42 % of the ex-
port effects related to trade with the UK (EFTA (1972), pp. 94-5). The only
explanation of these phenomena as results of EFTA affiliation would be if
investment with a gestation period of around seven years had been encouraged
in the textile and clothing sectors.- 46 -
trade effects of Portugal's EFTA connection appear to have been positive,
their magnitude was smaller than the $ 81 m. arrived at in the EFTA
3
study.
An ex post evaluation of the trade effects of Greece's 1962 association agree-
ment with the EEC has been undertaken by Hitiris. From quarterly data for
the years 1954-64 he estimated total import and export functions, neither of
which included a tariff variable. He then applied the estimated functions to
forecast trade values for the period 1963.1 - 1971.1. During these 29 quarters
the observed import figures exceeded the estimates in 21 quarters while in
only 16 were the observed export figures greater than the estimates. On
average, the actual imports exceeded the estimated figure by nearly 5 %,
while the actual export values were not significantly different from the
estimated ones (Hitiris (1972), pp. 156-7). When he estimated import and
export functions for the period 1955.1 to 1971.1 a dummy variable for the period
after association was significant in the import function, but not in the export
function (Hitiris (1972), p. 157). In sum, the association agreement appeared
to have a negative trade effect, equal to just less than 5 % of Greece's total
imports.
The studies by Kreinin and Loch and Hasenpflug examine the export effects
of Greece's association solely by means of export growth rates and market
shares. Between 1962 and 1970 Greece's total exports increased two and a
half times and the share going to the EEC rose from 35. 7 % to 45. 9 %.
Kreinin sees evidence of a positive export effect in these figures. Loch and
Hasenpflug play down the former figure by comparing the 370 % growth of
total EEC imports between 1958 and 1972 with the 325 % increase in Greek
4
exports to the EEC during this period. They attribute the post-1962 export
3
To give an idea of the magnitudes involved it may be noted that Portugal's
1967 trade deficit was $ 329 m.
4
There is no ground whatsoever for making such a comparison, which is
strongly influenced by the 21 % decrease in Greece's exports to the EEC
between 1958 and 1960 - a phenomenon whose relevance to an evaluation
of the 1962 agreement is difficult to comprehend.- 47 -
boom to the rapid industrialization of Greece in the 1960s, which forced
Greek producers to sell in the developed markets of the EEC. It is true
that industrialization is often accompanied by export expansion and that
this conclusion is consistent with the results of Hitiris, but the explanation
of the increased share of Greek exports going to the EEC is unconvincing.
Both of these studies assume that the import effects of the association agree-
ment were negligible, in Kreinin's case because Greece had to apply only
moderate reductions to her import duties and in Loch and Hasenpflug's case
because the sale of imported manufactured goods in developing countries is
not price elastic. The net trade effect of association is thus considered
positive by Kreinin and negligible by Loch and Hasenpflug, but both of these
conclusions rest on scanty foundations.
The trade effects of the 1963 association agreement between Turkey and the
EEC are also considered by Kreinin and Loch and Hasenpflug. Here, however,
their conclusions are unanimous. Turkey's exports increased sluggishly in
the 1960s, by only 50 % in the 1962-70 period, with no change in the share
going to the EEC. Both studies agree that the export effects of association
must have been minimal and they again assume negligible import effects
(for the same reasons as in the Greek case).
Although the conclusions of the various studies differ markedly, some syn-
thesising threads may be drawn together. The disagreement between Kreinin
and Loch and Hasenpflug is not over what happened, but in the interpretation
g
"Aufierdem ist bereits aus der theoretischen Analyse bekannt, dafi der Ab-
satz von Industriegutern auf den Markten der Entwicklungslander in der Re-
gel durch Faktoren wie Marktkenntnis, traditionelle Handelsbeziehungen,
Zahlungsbedingungen und Entwicklungshilfeleistungen sehr viel starker be-
einflufit wird als durch die geringen, durch Zollpraferenzen bedingten
Preisvorteile". (Loch and Hasenpflug (1974), p. 133). The word "theore-
tisch" is clearly misused here; their assertion can only be supported by
empirical studies, to which they make no reference.
They, in fact, cover all four possible combinations of rising or constant
imports and rising or constant exports!- 48 -
of events. The former sees industrial expansion as a necessary condition
for a positive response to preferences, whereas the latter see it as the
direct cause of export expansion, tariff preferences being largely irrelevant.
In view of their agreement on the primacy of industrial growth as an explan-
atory variable, these two hypotheses are difficult to test against one another
in a world of limited observations. Considerable doubt is, however, cast on
the EFTA study which made no reference to industrial progress in construct-
ing counterfactual estimates of Portuguese trade. This deficiency is not
present in Hitiris' analysis, since an index of industrial production is ex-
plicitly included in his import and export functions. With respect to the import
effect of preferences, the significantly negative results of the EFTA and
Hitiris studies are much more convincing than its assumed insignificance in
the other two studies. For Israel, which has granted reverse preferences to
the EEC, we may expect a significant import effect, but studies of other pre-
ference agreements give little indication of the expected size of the export
effect.
2. Theoretical Issues in the ex ante Determination of the Trade Effects
of Preferences
Early attempts to forecast the impact of preferences started from a simple
microeconomic model of a preference offered on a single good. Assuming an
infinitely elastic foreign supply from the preference recipients, the domestic
price in the preference-granting country falls by the amount of the preferential
tariff reduction. The increase in imports can be readily calculated from
knowledge of supply and demand elasticities, production and consumption levels,
and the reduction in the nominal tariff:
(1) A M. = -e^ t. (S. + M.) + e t. S. A 3 D 3 3 3 s j 3
J J
where t = change in domestic price, M = imports, S = domestic production for
the home market, en and e = elasticities of domestic demand and supply.- 49 -
In the case where preferences are offered on more than one good, equation
(1) is inappropriate because it takes no account of shifts in domestic supply
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and demand curves due to the input-output structure of the economy. The
reduced prices of material inputs shift domestic supply curves downwards
and the reduction of effective protection on goods using domestically-pro-
duced inputs shifts the domestic demand curve to the left. The effect of
these shifts is illustrated in Figure 1, where OP is domestic price, DD and
SS domestic demand and supply curves under the ante-preference regime.
The primed labels OP' , D' D' , S'S' apply to the post-preference situation.
Formula (1) would indicate an increase in imports fromQ-Q to Q Q , but
this overstates the real change which is,from Q..QO to Q^Q^. The latter can
be calculated for the jth good by the formula:
(2) AM. =1 (-e t. (S. + M.) + e . V. T .)
J ^ -\ J J J
J J
where T . = change in domestic price of value-added, e. = elasticity of supply
3 y J
of value-added ( = e . j/S.), V. = value-added in domestic production for
the home market.
The relevance of the above analysis to a specific case depends critically on
the applicability of the assumption of infinitely elastic import supply. If the
assumption holds, then imports will increase until the domestic price of
value-added in the preference-granting country has fallen by the proportion
T = -—"-•", where ERP is the effective rate of protection. Since Israel
1 + xLiJctir
accounts for a very small proportion of the EEC's manufacured exports
(o. 6 % in 1973), the assumption appears reasonable with respect to the effect
on Israel's imports of the preferences offered to EEC producers. When the
Israeli tariff is eliminated, the domestic price of traded goods will fall by
the extent of the tariff and domestic demand and supply curves will shift
towards D'D' and S
J S' . The import effect will be slightly understated by (2)
because prices of non-manufactured and non-traded material inputs will not
n
For a study using nominal tariffs see Reuber (1965). Use of the effective
protection approach was first made.in Balassa (1965). For the issues in-
volved see Johnson (1969) and the debate between Balassa and Leith and
Reuber in Economica, 1969 (pp. 130-8), 1970 (pp. 316-20) and 1971 (pp. 431-4).
Q
Note that Vj and Sj should be valued at world prices. The assumptions
underlying formula (2) are listed in Johnson (1969), p. 129.- 50 -







DD = domestic demand curvej SS = domestic supply
OP = domestic price. Primed values refer to the corresponding
concepts after the introduction of preferences.- 51 -
change by the amount of the ad valorem tariff. Further inexactitudes are
caused by the simplifying assumptions underlying (2), in particular the as-
sumptions of fixed material input coefficients and zero cross-elasticities in
demand between commodities. Since the EEC does not supply all Israel's
manufactured imports, our assumption of Israeli prices falling by the extent
of the tariff implicitly assumes infinite cross-elasticity of demand with
g
respect to the source of imports. A more general (partial equilibrium)
model of preferences would incorporate finite elasticities of substitution
between imports from the preference recipient and from third countries, but
empirical application of such a model would not be fruitful in view of the pre-
sent state of knowledge of the relevant parameters. Our implicit assumption
does not, however, appear too unreasonable with respect to manufactured
goods.
The assumption of infinite supply elasticity is far less convincing with respect
to Israel's manufactured exports to the EEC. Econometric estimates of
Israel's supply function of manufactured exports have all yielded significant-
ly positive price elasticities, but the estimated elasticities have all been less
than 2. In combination with the small share of EEC manufactured imports
which originate in Israel, this implies that EEC domestic prices will be only
minimally affected by the preferences granted to Israel. The increase in
Israel's exports is illustrated in Figure 2. Assuming infinitely elastic EEC
demand for imports from Israel at a price OC (equal to the "world price" OB
plus the common external tariff CB), the quantity of Israel's exports will
increase by DF and the value by CBGJ plus DFHJ. The sizes of these two
rectangles are xC and (1+c) X c e respectively, i.e.
X
(3) AX = cX (1 + e (1 + c) )
g
This does not mean that no imports from outside the EEC will survive the
preferences, but any other exporter to Israel will have to reduce his
(tariff-inclusive) export price to compete with EEC producers.
Clague (1972) had developed such a model, but the selection of parameters
is, as he states, highly arbitrary, in particular with respect to the elasti-
city of substitution in demand for the ith good from alternative sources
(and this is the parameter to which his results are most sensitive).
See the following section.- 52 -








EE = Israeli export supply curvej OB = the "world price'j
BC = the EEC tariff.- 53 -
where c = the EEC tariff rate, e = Israeli elasticity of export supply,
12
 x .
X = exports. In the reciprocal preference situation which will exist
between Israel and the EEC, (3) understates the increase in exports because
preferences granted by Israel will reduce input prices, shifting the export
supply curve, EE, downwards. Our estimates also ignore the increased
imports or reduced exports of raw materials, which result from increased
production for export.
3. Estimates of the Trade Effects on Israel
Although the 1975 EEC-Israel agreement provides for free-trade in manufac-
tured goods, the movement towards free trade will not occur overnight but
will last until 1977 for Israeli exports and until 1989 before all restrictions
on imports from the EEC are removed. Our estimates will compare the full
preference situation with the present and will ignore the transition period;
Since Israeli tariffs are to be reduced at a slower pace than EEC tariffs, the
net trade effects on Israel during the transition period will be more favourable
than the estimated full preference effects.
The year 1971 was selected as the base year for the calculations. By 1971
most quantitative restrictions on manufactured imports to Israel had been
removed and the proportion of domestic output facing non-liberalized imports
was high only in the mining and food and tobacco branches (Toren (1973),
p. 52). They are omitted from the estimates, as are the diamond and publish-
ing branches, in both of which zero tariffs predominated before 1971. Trade
and tariff data for the branches covered by the study are given in Table 1.
The weakness of this base year is that some unilateral n on-preferential
reductions in the Israeli tariff took place between 1971 and 1975, and the
12
It should be noted that X refers to total Israeli manufactured exports
(just as M in (1) and (2) referred,to total manufactured imports). Exports
to the EEC may increase by more than DF because exporters shift sales
from other markets, but total exports are determined by how much
Israeli producers are willing to sell at a price OC;- 54 -
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Sources: Central Bureau of Statistics: Israel's Foreign Trade, General
Summary 1973, pp. 33, 43-7; Pomfret (1976), Table A DC; Toren (1973),
p. 56.- 55 -
trade effects of these cuts will be attributed to the EEC agreement in cur
calculations. Use of the more recent years, 1973 and 1974, would have
been unconvincing, however, because they are often considered to have been
abnormal for the Israeli economy (due to the disruption of the October 1973
War). Although the absolute values of the estimates will clearly be out of
data, the percentage increases in exports and imports attributable to pre-
ferences appear not to be greatly affected by the choice of base year
(Clague (1972), p. 386).
Estimates of the effects of removing Israeli tariffs on manufactured imports
from the EEC are given in Table 2. The major data problem in applying
formula (2) is the assignment of values to e_ and e . Since estimates of
demand and supply elasticities are not available for Israel, two assignment
methods are adopted. In column (4) we follow Magee and assume (i) a short-
run elasticity of demand for imports of -3 and (ii) e = -0. 5 e . These
assumptions imply values of en = -0.25 and e =0.5 (Magee (1972), p. 665).
D S
Our second approach, column (5), is to use Glismann's estimates of en and
e by industrial branch in West Germany (Fels and Glismann (1975), pp. 87-9). s
The unweighted averages of these elasticities are e = -0. 10 and e =0. 19,
13
 S
i.e. less than 40 % of Magee's assumed values. Although both sets of
elasticities are taken from studies of developed economics, their relevance
to Israel is supported by estimated of Israel's import demand function.
Weinblat, using annual data for 1952-67, found price elasticities of -3.o7 for
final consumer goods, -2. 27 for investment goods, -0. 39 for intermediate
inputs and -1.358 for total imports. The last figure implies, in conjunction
13
Although Glismann's estimates of import demand elasticities are taken
from regression analysis of actual German imports and thus have more
scientific claim than Magee's assumed figures, they still have some
weaknesses. The values of en and e required for (2) are point
, elasticities on linear curves, whereas Glismann's estimates mostly
derive from import functions with non-linear specifications. The transit-
ion from import elasticities to e and e is made by assuming, like Magee,
that e_ = -0.5 e . It may be added, however, that point elasticities at
the existing import and price level cannot be determined in practice and
Glismann's approach does take us a step closer towards an approximation
of the incalculable.- 56 -





























































































































Source: value-added ratios were calculated from Statistical Abstract of Israel
1975, pp. 411-2; other columns were calculated from data in Table 1
by the methods described in the text. Calculations were made from
data before rounding.- 57 -
with the e = -0.5 e assumption, that e = -0.2 and e = 0.4, i.e.
s L) s 14
between the two sets of elasticities used in Table I. Since manu-
factured imports will primary fall in the final consumer goods and invest-
ment goods categories we should perhaps place more emphasis on the figures
in column (4), but since not all manufactured imports are consumer goods
this is an overestimate.
A further difficulty in applying formula (2) to an economy with a heavy re-
liance on foreign exchange is the choice of the relevant exchange rate for
calculating consumption levels. In Israel foreign exchange transactions are
valued in US dollars and domestic transactions in Israeli pounds. Since the
official exchange rate actually applies to few currency transactions, it is
meaningless as far as the national accounts are concerned. The relevant rate
is the effective exchange rate, which includes taxes in the case of imports
and subsidies in the case of exports. For 1971 the effective rate on exports
has been estimated at I£ 5. 04 per US dollar and on imports at I£ 5. 09 per
US dollar (Michaely (1975), p. 122).
The alternative estimates of the import effects are $ 239 million and
$ 89 million per annum, which represent increases over actual 1971 imports
of 20 % and 7 % respectively. In the light of Weinblat's estimates we might
expect the actual preference-induced increase in the import bill to be closer
to, but less than, the former estimate - somewhere around 15 % per annum.
The variable elasticity estimates are of interest because they are a more
accurate guide to the sectoral distribution of the increased imports. Although
the sectoral ranking differs little between the two estimates, the constant
elasticity estimates appear to understate the share of the three most important
sectors (metals and metal products, chemicals and fuel, and transport
14
Weinblat's results, originally published in Hebrew, are quoted in
Michaely (1975), p. 141. The relationship between e , e and the import
demand elasticity (e ) is: .
M + S e = m
which can be readily derived from Figure 1.
For discussion of the problem see Michaely (1971), especially pp. 61-6.- 58 -
equipment) in the incremental imports, which is over 50 % in the variable
elasticity estimates, and to overstate the share of textiles, clothing, non-
metallic mineral products and electrical and electronic equipment.
The empirical problem in estimating the effect on Israel's manufactured
exports of tariff-free access to EEC markets is, as with the import effects,
our lack of knowledge of elasticities. Use of estimates from other countries
is more dubious than in calculating import effects, because the structure
of exports is likely to differ more between countries than the structure of
aggregate demand or supply. Published export supply functions for Israel
fall into two categories, those employing a distributed lag function and those
using a simple non^lagged regression equation. Although it has been suggest-
ed that the former is a more appropriate specification (Halevi (1972), p. 298),
we will adopt estimates from the latter category. From annual data for the
period 1955-69 Halevi estimated a supply elasticity of industrial exports of
0.87 (Halevi (1972), p. 297) and for the period 1952-71 the present author
obtained an elasticity of 0. 52 (Pomfret (1976), chapter 3). The reasons for
not using the distributed lag estimates are threefold: (a) such estimates
imply an export supply elasticity which is more long-run in nature than the
elasticities used in computing the import effects and would thus reduce the
comparability of the estimated export and import effects , (b) neither of the
published distributed lag estimates satisfactorily overcomes the econometric
problems associated with that specification, (c) the simpler specifications
yield quite satisfactory results by the usual statistical criteria and thus
adoption of a more complex regression equation is unwarranted.
1 fi
For justification of this statement cf. Pomfret (1976), chapter 3.5 (d).
The major points are that the presence of serial correlation and the
problem of discretization both bias OLS estimates of the adjustment
coefficient downwards. The usual tests of significance applied to the
other coefficients are unreliable. Finally, even if the true equation is
not a distributed lag model, such a model will often yield reasonable
and significant results if there is serial correlation in the "true"
disturbances, e. g. because of omission of a relevant variable which is
itself serially correlated.- 59 -
The estimated export effects are $ 49 million assuming e = 0. 52 and
$ 63 million assuming e = 0. 87, i. e. 14 % and 18 % increases over actual
1971 levels (Table 3). The breakdown of incremental exports by industrial
branch is not of great interest in the absence of disaggregated export supply
elasticities. The calculated export effects are most sensitive to base year
export levels, with the result that the incremental exports have a similar
distribution to actual 1971 exports.
The total trade effect of the preferences is that Israel's manufactured im-
ports will increase by some 15 % per annum and her manufactured exports
17 by a slightly larger percentage. In view of Israel's large trade deficit in
manufactured goods, these figures imply a worsening of Israel's trade
position. In 1971 figures, her manufactured imports would increase from
$ 1210 million to circa $ 1390 million, while exports of these goods would
increase from $ 342 million to circa $ 400 million. Thus the short-run
effect of free trade in manufactures between Israel and EEC would be to
increase Israel's trade deficit in these goods from $ 868 million to approxi-
mately $ 990 million. The increase in the trade deficit appears even more
dramatic if the percentage changes are applied to Israel's record trade
deficit of 1974. In that year manufactured imports were $ 2375 million and
manufactured exports $ 773 million, and free Israel-EEC trade in these
goods would have increased Israel's trade deficit by some $ 233 million.
It may be noted, however, that this represents a smaller proportion of the
1 ft
aggregate trade deficit than the 1971 figures, which reflects the increasii
proportion of manufactured imports covered by manufactured exports.
17
Since the choice of base year leads to an overstatement of the import
effects and the omission of reduced input prices leads to an understate-
ment of the export effects, the percentage increase in exports may
exceed that in imports by an even greater extent than our results suggest.
In view of the importance of the unsatisfactory elasticity estimates, how-
ever, both the calculated import and export effects must be considered
approximations whose overall bias is unknown.
I Q
The aggregate trade deficit was $ 897 million in 1971 and $ 2461 million
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Sources: col. (1) Statistical Abstract of Israel 1975, p. 201; (2) Donges, Fels
and Neu (1973), p. 26; cols. (3) and (4) calculated from formula
(3) in text. Calculations were made from data before rounding.- 61 -
The actual impact of the trade effects will be influenced by the timetable of
tariff dismantlement. Since Israel's exports will enjoy free access to the
EEC markets by 1977, we can expect the full fruits of the export effects to
be gathered quickly. The import effects will, however, be felt much more
slowly since Israel can retain some restrictions until as late as 1989 and
will presumably seek to keep restrictions on goods with high import
elasticities. During the transition period the net trade effects will, there-
fore, be less negative for Israel than our estimates suggest.
4. Summary and Conclusions
Free trade with the EEC will lead to a substantial increase in both Israel's
imports and her exports. If the preferences were imposed immediately, the
net trade effects would be negative, increasing Israel's aggregate trade
deficit by circa 14 %. In fact, however, the preferences offered by Israel
will be implemented much more slowly than those offered by the EEC, and
the net trade effect during the transition period will be less negative.
These results contrast with the opinion of those who see tariff preferences
as irrelevant for non-developed countries' trade. They are, on the other
hand, consistent with the EFTA study on Portugal's trade relations within
EFTA and with some of the views on Greece's EEC association. The im-
plications for other Mediterranean countries are that free trade in manu-
factured goods with the EEC will be harmful to their balance of trade,
especially if existing tariffs are higher and export supply elasticities lower
than in Israel.
Finally, it must be emphasized that the direct trade effects are insufficient
for full evaluation of a free trade agreement. They provide no guide to the
welfare effects of the agreement. Knowledge of their magnitude is, however,
necessary for estimation of the welfare changes resulting from the agreement
and, if the foreign exchange constraint is binding, the net trade effects may
have direct implications for economic growth.- 62 -
Chapter 6: The Static Welfare Effects
The aim of this chapter is to estimate the social welfare benefits of the changes
in Israeli trade in manufactured goods resulting from free trade with the EEC.
The base year, coverage and assumptions adopted in estimating the direct trade
effects are retained, so that the analysis is a comparative static study of the
full preference and no preference situations from Israel' s point of view. The
welfare effects are calculated in terms of surpluses accruing to buyers and
sellers and tariff revenues sccruing to the government. The first section presents
the estimated welfare effects of the preference-induced increase in imports and
the second section deals with the export side. The results are summarized in
the final section.
1. The Welfare Effects of Preferences on Imports
The welfare benefits to Israel of removing a n on -prohibitive tariff are illustrated
in Figure 3. Assuming linear domestic demand and supply curves (DD and SS
and perfectly elastic import supply at a cif price OG, abolition of the tariff GH
leads to home production falling from OX to OW and imports increasing from
XY to YZ. If DD coincides with the Hicksian compensated demand curve, then
the area A + B + G + E measures the increase in consumers' welfare resulting
from abolition of the tariff . Unfortunately, compensated demand curves cannot
be observed and they can only be constructed under strong
The Hicksian compensated demand curve indicates the quantity demanded at
each price, assuming that consumers' incomes are adjusted so that they remain
on the initial indifference curves. Thus the area A + B + G + E represents
the amount of income which consumers, who are free to purchase any quantity
of the good at the reduced price, would have to lose in order to leave them at
their initial welfare position (Hicks (1956), p.99).- 63 -




DD = domestic demand curve, SS = domestic supply curve,
OG= the "world price", GH = the tariff.- 64 -
2
assumptions . This problem will be evaded here by assuming that the
assigned demand elasticities, which are themselves not based on observed
Israeli data, are appropriate to a compensated demand curve.
Two components of the increase in consumers' welfare are transfers within
the Israeli economy. The change in the area between the supply curve and the
price line, area A in Figure 3, measures the loss in economic rent accruing
3
to domestic factors of production . Area G measures the reduction in govern-
ment revenue due to abolition of the tariff. The remaining two portions of the
increased consumer surplus have no offsetting welfare losses and are there-
4
fore known as the deadweight loss from the tariff . Under the assumption that
the supply elasticity of imports from the EEC at the world price is infinite,
Israel will recoup the total deadweight loss by allowing tariff free access to
EEC goods and area B + E measures her net welfare gain.
Extension of the above analysis to the multigood case leads to considerable
theoretical complications. These are overcome by retaining the simplifying
2
Compensated demand functions can be derived from certain aggregate utility
functions (Carrie, et al. (1971), p. 753). The more usual approach is to assume
that compensated and ordinary demand curves coincide, for which the
simplest condition is that each individual has a zero income elasticity of
demand for the good. Although this sufficient, but not necessary, condition
may be justifiable for a single good, it is more dubious when several
commodities' prices are changing, in which case income effects are un-
likely to be small and the area under the ordinary demand curve will over-
state the consumers' s welfare gain from the price reduction (Hicks (1956),
p. 179).
3
If SS is compensated supply curve corresponding to the tariff situation, then
area A is the amount of compensation which would have to be paid to all
factor-owners in order to leave them in the initial welfare position, assuming
that they are free to supply any quantity after compensation. For the problems
involved in this analysis see Currie et al. (1971), pp. 753-64.
4
The above analysis was developed by Corden (1957) and Johnson (1960). For
criticism of the assumed welfare neutrality of the transfers see Tullock
(1967).- 65 -
assumptions of fixed material input coefficients and zero cross-
elasticities in demand between commodities. The "welfare triangles" B and
E can now be simply calculated from our estimates of the increase in imports
resulting from the preferences. The two components of the increases imports
must be multiplied by half of the change in the relevant domestic price:
(4) B = 1/2 E T e V. T
-I J J J *J
(5) E = 1/2 r t (-e ) t (S + M )
J J ^ J J J
J
where all symbols are defined as before. The areas G and (A + B) are equal
to the nominal ad valorem tariff multiplied by imports and domestic produc-
tion for the home market respectively.
The welfare effects of the preferences granted by Israel to EEC producers
of manufactured goods are presented in Table 4. As with the trade effects,
two sets of estimates are given based on alternative demand and supply
elasticities. It is expected that the true elasticities for Israel lie between
these, but somewhat closer to the higher values . Using the constant
elasticities (e = -0.25, e = 0. 5) the net welfare gain from the preferences
s £
is I£ 190 million, or 1. 21 % of total consumption of the goods covered . Use
This expectation was supported in the trade effects analysis by reference to
Weinblat' s elasticity estimates. The situation is less clear in the present
analysis, since the elasticities refer to compensated demand and supply
curves which are not observed. The strong assumptions required for coinci-
dence of compensated and ordinary curves (e. g. zero income elasticity of
demand or parallel indifference curves for factor owners) are unlikely to
obtain when the price change concerns a commodity bundle as large as
manufactured importables. If the compensated and ordinary curves diverge,
the compensated demand curve will normally be less elastic than the ordinary
curves. In that case values of e and e based on ordinary curves will over-
state the net-gain-of-consumers^ -surplus triangle (area E) and understate
the excess-production-cost triangle (area B), the net bias being unclear and
hopefully small.
The gain from tariff elimination has been estimated, using the same elastici-
ties, at 0. 17 % of domestic consumption in the USA and 0. 16 % in West
Germany (Fels and Glismann (1975), p. 71). The greater potential benefit in
the Israeli case is a consequence of her higher tariffs and import/
consumption ratios.Table 4 : Welfare Effects on Israel of Duty-Free Access for Manufactured Imports from the EEC <I£ million, 1971 values)
(a) Constant e , e
Cain in consumers
1 welfare
Loss of tariff revenue





(b) Variable eD> es
Cain in consumers' welfare
Loss of tariff revenue




































































































































































































Source: calculated from Tables 1 and 2 by the methods explained in the text. Calculations were made from the data before rounding.- 67 -
of Glismann' s variable elasticities produces the lower estimate of I£ 69 million,
or 0. 44 % of consumption. The net welfare gains are accompanied by large
transfers, equal to a quarter of total consumption, from producers and the
government to consumers. The scale of these transfers, relative to the size
of the "welfare triangles", indicates how heavily interpretation of the latter
as the net welfare gain rests on the assumed neutrality of the welfare trans-
7
fers .
The net social welfare gains occur primarily in three industrial branches:
basic metals and metal products, transport equipment and chemicals. In the
variable elasticity estimates these three branches account for over half of
the net benefits. Using constant elasticities, the gains in non-metallic mineral
products slightly exceed and in clothing equal those in chemicals. These
results do no more than reflect the classification system, since the three
branches have the largest domestic production for the home market and the
biggest import bills. Of greater interest in evaluating the incidence of the
net gains is their ratio to consumption. By this measure the most important
sectors are non-metallic minerals, rubber and plastics, clothing, wood and
Q
paper, irrespective of the choice of elasticities . Each of these five sectors
is characterized by high nominal or effective protection, and none is
particularly distinguished in absolute size of domestic consumption or im-
ports. The implication is that tariff levels are of prime importance in
determining the relative size of the net welfare gain.
1
The estimates of the net welfare gains are subject to an aggregation bias.
Since tariffs vary within industrial branches and the estimates depend on
the square of the lariff rate, the gains will be undervalued. Magee calculated
that his US estimates had to be adjusted upwards by a correction factor of
2. 87. It is impossible to derive a similar measure for Israel, because dis-
aggregated effective tariff rates are unavailable. Even with a correction
factor of 3, however, the net welfare gains only equal 5 % or 14 % of the
total gain in consumers' welfare, depending on which elasticities are used.
Q
Leather has a high net welfare gain/consumption ratio using the variable
elasticities, but the second lowest ratio with the constant elasticities. This
is the single anomaly between the two rankings, which are otherwise very
close, and in view of the small size of the leather branch is not a serious
problem.- 68 -
The largest gains in consumers' welfare are recorded in the non-metallic
minerals and clothing branches. In both cases this represents a transfer from
factors of production, who suffer a corresponding loss in economic rent in
these branches. The cause of the welfare transfers is the high nominal tariffs.
The next largest consumer gains are in basic metals and metal products,
textiles, wood and transport equipment. In the first and last of these the size
of the gains reflects the absolute size of the branch. The textiles and wood
branches are, however, considerably smaller in terms of both domestic
production for the home market and import levels, and the consumer gains
9
are due to the high nominal tariffs .
The welfare losses are borne primarily by producers; over 60 % of the gain
in consumers' welfare stems from reduced economic rent accruing to domestic.'
factors of production. The incidence of the loss of economic rent is un-
surprisingly in the branches of consumers' welfare gain: clothing, non-metallic
minerals, basic metals and metal products, textiles and wood. The ranking
of branches by producers' loss/output for the home market ratios is almost
perfectly correlated with their ranking by nominal tariff rates . The reason
for this is that all losses of economic rent are attributed to the branch where
the final product appears, and the price of the final product changes by the
amount of nominal tariff...
Although less important than the loss in economic rent, the loss in tariff
revenue accounts for over 30 % of the gain in consumers' welfare. In three
branches, transport equipment, machinery and miscellaneous goods, the
transfer of tariff revenue is the major source of consumers' welfare gain.
These three branches are characterized by high import/consumption ratios -
64 %, 72 % and 73 % respectively, while no other branch has a ratio over
9
The estimated consumer gains are not very sensitive to the choice of
elasticities because calculation of area A + B + G in Figure 3 is independent
of demand and supply elasticities.
The only difference in the rankings is that the transport equipment and
chemical branches, in the last and penultimate places, reverse positions.- 69 -
50 % - and by moderate to low nominal tariffs. The other branches where
the loss in tariff revenue is large, basic metals and metal products and
electrical equipment, have moderate tariffs and large absolute import
levels. The negative correlation between nominal tariff rates and tariff
revenue is of course predictable from the import elasticities quoted above,
which are negative with absolute values greater than unity.
In sum, the effect of removing Israeli tariffs on manufactured imports from
the EEC is to increase Israeli consumers' surplus by almost I£ 4, 000 million,
which is equal to 25 % of domestic consumption of manufactured goods. Of
this amount, between I£ 69 million and I£ 190 million represents a net welfare
gain to society, while the remainder consists of transfers from domestic
factors of production and the Israeli government. Total consumers' gains
and net social welfare gains are greatest, relative to domestic consumption
levels, in those branches with the highest tariff rates. These gains are
primarily at the expense of economic rent accruing to producers. Transfers
from the government to consumers' surplus occur in branches with moderate
tariffs and high import/consumption ratios.
2. The Welfare Effects of Preferences on Exports
Estimation of the welfare benefits from the increase in Israeli exports is
easier than the preceding import-side analysis because no intra-Israel
welfare transfers are involved. The assumptions behind the estimates of the
trade effects of EEC-granted preferences are retained, in particular that
the export price is increases by the common external tariff and that the
Israeli domestic price level is not affected. The welfare benefits to Israel
consist entirely of increased economic rent accruing to factors of production,
i. e. the area between the export supply curve and the price line, and the
export supply curve should be interpreted as the compensated supply curve
corresponding to the no-preference situation.- 70 -
Not all of the increased export earnings resulting from tariff-free access
to the EEC represent a welfare gain to Israel. The increase in export
earnings, area CBGJ + DFHJ in Figure 2J can be decomposed into:
(a) previous EEC tariff revenue now accruing to Israeli factors mf
production as economic rent = area CBGJ in Figure 2,
(b) economic rent on the increased production for export = area GJH,
(c) the exchange of additional domestic resources for foreign currency
= area GDFH.
12 The Israeli welfare gain is measured by (a) + (b) , which are equal to
1 2 cX and /2 c X e respectively.
X
The estimated welfare benefits are given in Table 5 using the alternative
export supply elasticities, which are now assumed to apply to compensated
supply curves. The value of the exchange of additional resources (equal to
1 13
(1 + /2 c) X c e ) is also provided . Under the lower elasticity assutnp*
tion 65 % of the increased export earnings takes the form of an increase
in welfare, while the remaining 35 % is a simple exchange of additional
resources. With the higher elasticity the proportions are 53 % and 47 %
12
The welfare gain is understated (overstated) if there is a diversion of
exports from third countries in whose markets Israeli exporters received
a price less (greater) than OB. If production is diverted from the
domestic market to the EEC there will be a welfare transfer from
Israeli consumers to Israeli producers. Both situations are ruled out
in the present analysis by the simplifying assumptions.
13
The dollar values have been converted into Israeli pounds according
to the aggregate effective exchange rate on exports (K 5.04 / $) for
comparability with the welfare effects of the Israeli-offered
preferences.Table 5 : Welfare Effects on Israel of Duty-Free Entry to the EEC for Manufactured Exports (I£ million, 1971 values)
(i) ex - 0.52
(a) Transfer of EEC tariff revenue
(b) Economic rent on increased exports
Increased welfare « (a) + (b)
(c) Exchange of additional resources
(ii) ex - 0.87
(a) Transfer of EEC tariff revenue
(b) Economic rent on increased exports
Increased welfare - (a) + (b)













































































































































Source: calculated from Table 1 by the methods explained in the text. Calculations were made from the data before rounding.- 72 -
14 respectively . The absolute value of the welfare increase is, however,
rather insensitive to the choice of elasticity assumption, varying between
I£ 162. 6 million and K 165. 5 million. The reason for the insensitivity
is that the welfare gain consists overwhelmingly of the transfer from EEC
governments of the tariff revenues on existing exports. Since the size of
this transfer depends only on EEC tariff rates and the actual level of
Israeli exports, the calculated welfare benefits should be much more
accurate than the estimated benefits from preferences granted by Israel.
3. Conclusions
Free trade in manufactured goods with the EEC will yield a net short-run
social welfare gain to Israel of some I£ 150 million on the import side
and I£ 164 on the export side. The former sum is a pure gain from trade,
while the latter is primarily a transfer from EEC governments . The
14
The ratio of the increased welfare to the exchange of additional
resources ( a ) is inversely related to the export elasticity of supply.
The relationship can be derived from the formulae for the respective




a = 2L = (_I_ + 1/2 c) . (1 +
 x/2 c)
(1 + /2 c) X c e x
If a loglinear export supply curve is assumed, then the relationship is;
« - e -
1
X
(for derivation cf. Blackhurst (1971)). Since /2 c is small relative to
unity and to ex, the two expressions are very similar in the present
case; a = 1.85 when e =0.52 and a = 1.13 when e =0.87, and
(0.52)"
1 = 1.92 and (0.87) "
X = 1.15.
Under the assumptions used here the preferences offered by Israel will
yield a social welfare gain to the EEC (in the form of increased economic
rent to factors of production), whereas the preferences granted by the
EEC do not.- 73 -
net gain is accompanied by substantial welfare transfers from the Israeli
government and factors of production to consumers.
The structural changes in production and consumption resulting from the
preferences are not frictionless and impose a short-run welfare loss.
Adjustment costs are incurred by all factors of production, but the most
serious are generally considered to be those borne by labour. There is
no ideal measure of this cost end no estimates are made here. The order
of magnitude of the labour adjustment problem can be calculated under the
simple, but unrealistic, assumption that the marginal product of labour
is equal to its avarage product. If this were the case, employment in
import-competing production would fall by 4 - 10 % and in export production
1 fi
would increase by 4 - 5 % . Since production for the home market was
450 % greater than production for exports and since marginal products
normally exceed avarage products, the labour adjustment involved will
clearly be great. The social cost is, however, reduced by the absence of
structural unemployment in Israel.
A second adjustment cost may arise from the need to cover the preference-^
induced widening of the trade deficit. Lowering export prices (in dollar
terms) will only reduce revenues if demand is highly elastic and increased
1 fi
The change in employment in import-competing production is equal to
the change in domestic price of value-added multiplied by the elasticity
of domestic supply of value-added:
(i) xe v = .440 x .5 x .438 = .096 s
(ii)
 Te v = .440 x . 18 x .438 = .035
The change in employment in export production is equal to the change in
the export price multiplied by the elasticity of export supply:
(i) c(l + c)"
1e = .073 x (1.073)"
1 x 0.52 = .035
(ii) c(l + c)"
1e = .073 x (1.073)"
1 x 0.87 = .059r 74 -
import restrictions are ruled out as an effective remedy. One answer is
devaluation, but the analysis of exchange rate changes is explicitly
omitted from the present study. If, however, the Israeli government is
unwilling to devalue to the extent necessary to eliminate the increase in
the deficit, then it must resort either to international borrowing or to
running down its reserves
1 7
In such a situation the "simple exchange of additional resources"
estimated in section 2 is not welfare neutral, since this method of
transforming domestic resources into foreign resources has lower
opportunity costs than the alternatives.- 75 -
Chapter 7: Changes in Factor Productivity
In the preceding analysis the Free Trade Area was assumed to have no
impact on Israeli supply curves via increased factor productivity. Customs
union theory has, however, pointed to two sources of increased factor
productivity which might result from the FTA: economies of scale (i. e.
movements along a downward-sloping long-run average cost curve) and
forced changes in efficiency (i. e. shifts in the domestic supply curve) due
to foreign competition. The present chapter examines the possibility of these
occurring in Israel and their implications for the analysis in chapters 5
and 6.
1. The Size Structure of Industry and the Evolution of Industrial
Organization Policy in Israel
The size distribution of industrial establishments in Israel possesses two
striking features. The majority of establishments are small; in 1971/2 70 %
employed less than five people . On the other hand, over 50 % of the industrial
labour force in 1971/2 worked in establishments employing 100 or more people.
These phenomena have important consequences for technical efficiency and
market structure and also for exports.
The causes of the existing size distribution of industrial establishments
include sociological and technical factors. The atomized industrial structure
directly reflects the prevalence of owner-operated businesses in Israel. In
the 1965 industrial census 9,070 out of 24, 528 establishments did not engage
employees, and 7, 073 of these 9, 070 had only one employed person. The
existence of the large enterprises at the other end of the spectrum reflects
the presence of technical factors which make small-scale establishments
uncompetitive in some lines of production. The large establishments are not
uniformly distributed across industrial branches, but are concentrated in
Employed persons are defined to include owners and unpaid family members
as well as employees.- 76 -
those branches where cross-country studies have shown scale economies to
be greatest .
A further determinant of the industrial structure has been government policy.
In the 1950s the government encouraged new firms in the hope that increased
competition would raise efficiency and reduce prices. This hope was not
fulfilled because the small size of the domestic market precluded effective
competition in most industries. Although the Knesset passed a Restrictive
Practices Act in 1959 making cartels subject to registration and approval,
the government attitude was to favour cartelization in the hope of increasing
exports by utilizing economies of scale in production and marketing and by
subsidizing exports out of monopoly profits on domestic sales (via so-called
"equilization funds"). The cartel policy came under criticism for being
inequitable and inefficient, and it'moreover failed to make the expected
contribution to exports . In the second half of the 1960s the government began
to look more favourably on mergers rather than cartels and the current
4
policy is to encourage mergers as long as they do not create monopolies .
The consequences of government policy are reflected in the changing size
distribution of industrial establishments (Table 6). Between the 1955 and 1965
2
Teitel found that the ranking of two-digit industries by employee/establish-
ment ratios did not differ significantly across a sample of 25 countries
(Teitel (197 5), p. 109). The Spearman rank correlation coefficient between
Teitel' s average ratios and the 14 industries for which comparable Israeli
data were available (in the CBS Census of Industry and Crafts - 1965, No. 1,
p. 14) was 0. 85, which is significant at the 1 % level. These results suggest
that the large firms found in basic metal and textile industries, for example,
are ? result of objective technical factors which are not affected by the
institutional or policy arrangements in individual countries.
3
Out of 28 industrial cartels approved in the years 1962-4 on the grounds of
encouraging exports only 14 increased their exports, while 6 did not change
their exports and 8 reduced their exports (Shefer (1971), p. 419).
4
Although this is the stated policy, some Israeli economists believe that the-
formulation merely pays lipservice to the anti-monopoly cause and that the
policy is in fact to encourage mergers even when they lead to monopoly.
Evidence for this viewpoint is provided by the many mergers which have led
to monopoly in recent years, e. g. tyres, electric bulbs, beer, chocolate,
asbestos, cement and paints.- 77 -
industrial censuses the proportion of smaller establishments increased and
the average number employed per establishment fell from 13. 3 to 9. 1, but
between 1965 and 1971/2 the percentage of the industrial labour force in
establishments employing over 100 people increased from 35 % to 51 % and
the average number employed per establishment increased to 12.7. Despite
the increase in firm size in the last decade, however, no Israeli firm is
large by international standards .
An Israeli firm does not have to be large by international standards in order
to have a large share of the domestic Israeli market and many product
markets are characterized by high concentration of domestic production.
In 1965 in 24 out of the 114 four-digit sub-branches of industry the largest
three enterprises accounted for over 80 % of output, in 16 other sub-branches
they accounted for over 60 % and in 27 further sub-branches for over 40 %
of output (Merhav (1970), pp. 28-31). These are moreover underestimates
of the extent of market concentration because within the four-digit categories
there are clearly defined markets for individual products (especially in the
n. e. s. categories, which usually appear as low-concentration industries).
Even at the four-digit level of aggregation more up-to-date data are
unavailable, but it may be surmised in the light of government policy that
market concentration has increased since 1965.
Evidence on the extent of unrealized scale economies in Israel is sparse .
Israeli economists are overwhelmingly of the opinion that such economies
are extensive and the scattered data support this view. More detailed
industry studies from other countries indicate that the minimum optimal
No Israeli firm is included in the Fortune 300 largest industrial companies
outside the US, despite the fact that 26 nations are represented on the list.
For fuller treatment see Pomfret (1976), chapter 7. 1. The empirical
question cannot satisfactorily be answered until detailed studies of the cost
structure of Israeli industries are available. Some anecdotal evidence of
unrealized scale economies in Israel is given in Kreinin (1968), especially
pp. 298, 309, 311.- 78 -








































































































Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel 1957/8, p. 176; Ibid., 1967, p. 374;
Ibid., 1974, p. 416.- 79 -
scale in many industries is far larger than the size of Israel' s domestic
market.
The already high level of market concentration and the existence of further
unrealized scale economies place the government in a policy dilemma
between encouraging large firms and mergers in the name of increased
technical efficiency and reducing market control in the name of static
allocational efficiency. Israeli government policy has shifted increasingly
in favour of promoting technical efficiency at the expense of a competitive
industrial structure. The current policy stand is to encourage increased
firm size to the point of duopoly and to leave the duty of providing competition
to liberalized imports. The FTA fits in with this policy by providing in-
creased incentives for realizing economies of scale and increased competi-
tion from liberalized imports.
2. Benefits of the Free Trade Area arising from Economies of Scale
Attempts at measuring the benefits from increased realization of economies
of scale within a customs union or free trade area have been few and un-
7
convincing - doubtless reflecting economists' general ignorance of the
significance of scale economies. This situation has permitted widely con-
flicting claims to be made for the beneficial effects of forming a CU on the
realization of scale economies. Politicians have been particularly eager
to use the argument in order to justify an essentially political alignment
(e. g. Macmillan a propos the UK and the EEC, quoted by Krauss (1972),
p. 420). Economists have been more sceptical of this source of gain and
it was not emphasised in the classic works on CU theory (Viner (1950),
7
An exception is Carnoy' s study of the benefits from the minimum cost
locating of industries within six product groups in a Latin American common
market. The study goes beyond the scale economy benefits from a CU or
FTA because fuller integration is assumed, but it reveals that minimum
optimal scales of operation are pervasively large relative to semi-developed
countries' domestic market size (Carnoy (1972)).- 80 -
Q
p. 46; Meade (1955), p. 94) . The lack of emphasis in CU theory appears to
reflect firstly the prejudgement that economies of scale are insignificant
(e.g. Johnson (1962) and Pearce (1970), pp. 210-24) and secondly the con-
clusion that even if they exist they are theoretically uninteresting (e. g.
Krauss (1972), pp. 420-1).
The last conclusion is based on the premise that if the minimum point on a
firm' s long-run average cost ( 2,rac) curve lies below the world price then
the firm should be an exporter sympathetic to free trade, whereas if the
minimum point on the £rac curve is above the world price domestic production
can only take place behind protective barriers. Free trade leads to the
welfare optimum. Since a FTA possesses elements of both free trade and
protection, it can lead to either a net welfare gain or a net welfare loss when
decreasing costs exist (Corden (1972)). As Krauss points out, however,
this finding is not very interesting and can be incorporated into the usual
concepts of trade creation and trade diversion simply by extending the
definitions of these concepts to cover decreasing cost curves.
The existence of economies of scale has an impact on the magnitude of trade
creation and its welfare consequences. Abstracting from transport costs,
the trade effects depend critically on whether the minimum point of the £rac
curve, at the fixed exchange rate and post-FTA import prices, lies above
or below the f.-o.b. world price. In the former case, if domestic production
exists, it will be eliminated in the FTA and all domestic consumption will
be supplied by imported goods. It is possible in this case that the firm is an
exporter, if the world price covers marginal cost before exporting (Basevi
(1970); Pomfret (1975)), and the exports too will no longer take place in the
FTA . In the latter case, the firm' s exports depend on the price it actually
Q
Greater emphasis was placed on scale economies bySBcitovsky (1958),
pp. 110-35, and Balassa (1962), pp. 101-62, but they have not had many
followers among economists. Economists stressing scale economies have
often emphasised their importance with respect to marketing and research
and development, rather than just production. This can be incorporated
into the following analysis by replacing the normal £rac (of producing more
goods) curve, by a more general &rac of developing, producing and selling
more goods curve (cf. Lipsey (1960), p. 511).- 81 -
receives. Free access to EEC markets means that existing exporters will
increase their foreign sales, firms whose minimum £rac previously ex-
ceeded the world price or undercut it by less than the common external
tariff will start to export to the EEC, and some new firms now able to
operate at large enough scale to earn a reasonable return from replacing
imports and exporting will be established. The estimates in chapter 5 of the
trade effects of removing Israeli tariffs are incomplete, because they fail
to take account of the ensuing reduction in exports and they ignore the
positive trade effects of reduced imported input prices inducing new exports
of decreasing-cost products. The estimates in chapter 5 also understate the
positive trade effects of free access to the EEC markets.
The introduction of decreasing-cost curves into the analysis has no effect
on the gains in consumers' surplus from Israeli tariff elimination, but it
does affect the estimated changes in rent accruing to domestic factors of
production, which were calculated in chapter 6. The area A in Figure, 3
represents the change in rent in an increasing cost industry, but in decreas-
g
ing-cost industries area A does not exist . The critical consideration in
such industries is the general equilibrium change in factor prices (Wonnacott
and Wonnacott (1967), ch. 15). Elimination of the Israeli tariff leaves the
factors involved in production by firms which go out of business unemployed,
but creates new employment in those firms which expand their output. If
the net effect is increased unemployment, (money) factor prices will fall
until a new equilibrium is reached. Elimination of the EEC tariff increases
the export opportunities for Israeli firms and reduces the extent by which
money incomes must fall. The resulting welfare loss is less than that
calculated under the assumption of increasing cost curves, and hence the
net welfare gain is greater.
g
If demand pressure is put on specific factors suited to production of a good,
their prices might rise (and include an element of economic rent) even
though the firm' s cost curve is falling. Therefore, changes in economic
rent cannot be excluded when a decreasing cost firm goes out of business
or expands its output.- 82 -
In the previous section it was concluded that unrealized scale economies
exist in many Israeli industries. Some of the firms operating on decreasing
cost curves will be eliminated in the FTA,. while others will expand. Lack
of industry level data prevents any concrete analysis of the phenomena, but
the existence of unrealized scale economies will almost certainly increase
the benefits from the FTA. The trade effects are likely to be more favour-
able and the welfare gains will be greater than in increasing-cost industries.
The adjustment costs may also be greater because production is eliminated
entirely in some decreasing-cost industries, but in general the welfare
losses to factors of production are more evenly spread (in the form of a
general reduction in money wages) than in a world of increasing cost
curves.
3. Gains from Forced Efficiency
Increased competition from foreign firms may be expected to have a salutary
effect on the efficiency of firms in a . country acceding to a customs union
or free trade area (Lipsey (1960), p. 512). Production may not be carried
out by technically efficient processes for a large number of reasons, e. g.
close personal relations between businessmen, the quest for a quiet life
and stable income, high profit margins (cf., Scitovsky (1958), pp. 26-8).
Market concentration is not the cause of technical inefficiency, but may be
a necessary condition for the above reasons to operate.
Economists have been sceptical of this source of gain. After all, traditional
theory rules out the possibility by assuming that production always takes
place on the production possibility frontier. The assumption was strongly
criticized by Leibenstein (1966), who sought to show that the social costs
from resource misallocation were small compared to the social costs from
failing to attain the production frontier, which he labelled X-(in)efficiency.
Leibenstein argued that X-efficiency is strongly correlated with the motivation
of resource-owners. This argument has been criticized as purely semantic,
because motivational changes lead to changes in the composition of output
rather than to increased output, e.g. observed increases in material output- 83 -
may have negative impact on health and leisure which also enter into resource-
owners' utility fuctions (Stigler (1976), p. 213). For the present study it is
not a semantic problem, because material output may consist of traded goods
while health and leisure are non-tradables. Thus increased X-efficiency
may make the trade effects of the FTA more favourable for Israel, although
the increased material output does not necessarily involve a net welfare
gain.
The degree of X-inefficiency in Israel is impossible to determine in the
absence of detailed knowledge of cost curves. The general impression is
that Israeli businessmen are aware of the range of available techniques and
implement them efficiently. Business practice is not restricted by goodwill
towards competitors, as can be seen from the tendencies towards concentra-
tion. High profit margins undoubtedly exist in monopolistic and oligopolistic
industries, but they do not necessarily involve technical inefficiency other
than a failure to realized economies of scale.
There is also considerable doubt as to whether the elimination of Israeli
tariffs will reduce any X-inefficiency which does exist. The flow of trade
is determined by comparative, not absolute advantage, and if Israel entered
the FTA with an exchange rate which would yield a balanced external account
there would be no effect on X-efficiency. Since Israel' s exchange rate is
overvalued and the short-run net trade effect of the FTA will be negative,
it may be hoped that domestic producers will react by increasing efficiency
to achieve an external balance at the existing exchange rate. There is little
basis for this hope, and it is more likely that the short-run consequences
will be increased unemployment and reduced national income, unless
resources can be transferred in sufficient numbers to expanding decreasing*
cost industries.
It has been argued that pressures to increase X-efficiency can arise from
favoured access to export markets (Williamson (1971)> pp* 39-42). If
Israeli exporters strain to be competitive in the tough EEC markets,
X-efficiency may be raised. This will most likely be at the expense of other- 84 -
arguments in the utility function, possibly leading to net welfare losses, but
improved trade effects. The argument is, however, not very convincing.
4. Conclusions
A major feature of Israel' s industrial organization policy has been the belief
that scale economies are substantial for many industries at output levels up
to and exceeding domestic Israeli demand at any reasonable prices. Recent
government policy has been to permit increased industrial concentration in
order to realize greater economies of scale, while liberalizing imports in
order to restrict the welfare losses from oligopoly and monopoly. The FTA
is consistent with this policy and in chapter 6 the gains from reduced
monopoly power, abstracting from scale economies, were estimated. In
decreasing-cost industries the welfare gains will be greater because of the
reduced resources needed to produce the existing, as well as the incremental,
output. The trade_effects are also more favourable in decreasing-cost
industries, although adjustment costs may be greater. A second source of
bias in the estimated welfare and net trade effects is the possibility of shifts
in supply curves due to increases in technical efficiency induced by the
competitive pressures within the FTA. The effects of such shifts are unlikely
to be large, although they will improve Israel' s belance of trade
The net welfare effects are unknown, as explained above. The reason for
indeterminancy is that compensated supply curves may not have shifted
downwards with the resource-owners' response to the new pressures.- 85 -
Chapter 8: Changes in Factor Quantities
There are no provisions in the 1975 agreement for an increased flow of
factors of production, e. g. in the form of financial aid, into Israel.
Nevertheless, by changing the economic and political parameters affecting
factor movements, the agreement may alter Israel' s factor availability.
Labour migration to Israel is primarily determined by non-economic motives,
and, although net migration is responsive to economic conditions in
Israel, the increased real wages resulting from the free trade area are
unlikely to have a great effect, especially as the magnitude of net migration
is now small relative to the total labour force. Similarly, unilateral trans-
fers to Israel are determined by political and psychological motives, rather
than on economic grounds. The free trade area will, however, affect the
level of foreign investment in Israel, and it is on thismagnitude that the
present chapter will focus.
1. Preferences and Foreign Investment in Theory and Practice
Portfolio investment in developing countries has long been a feature of the
international economic scene, as has direct investment in sectors producing
material inputs and in infrastructure. Direct foreign investment (DFI)
in the manufacturing sector is a more recent phenomenon, which has
assumed great significance in the postwar world. Initially the decision to
locate industrial production abroad was viewed as an alternative to
exporting and was determined by production and transport costs, political
stability and market conditions (size, growth, access, etc.); in particular
the protectionist trade palicies of many LDCs in the 1950s made import-
substituting DFI attractive to multinational enterprises. A more recent
phenomenon has been the location in LDCs of multinational enterprises
in "footloose" industries, which have been influenced by supply considera-
tions and have produced for export rather than for the domestic market.
Four determinants of the location of export-oriented DFI have been- 86 -
identified: labour costs adjusted for productivity, distance costs,, govern-
ment policies and political stability and security (Helleiner (1973),
p. 44). Empirical studies have indicated that cost and revenue variables
are significant in explaining the time path of export-oriented DFI within
a host country .
Although the literature has emphasised wage rate differentials, export
price differentials are in principle equally of interest to export-oriented
DFIs. In 1968 Johnson forecast that the aspect of the Generalized System
of Preferences which might cause the most serious challenge zu U.S. busi-
ness was a type of trade deflection, "in which the production facilities
required to turn labor and raw materials into salable products are trans-
planted from developed to less-developed countries in order to obtain the du-
al advantages of tariff-free or preferential market access and lower
labor cost" (Johnson (1968), p. 19). This possibility was also referred
to in Clague' s study of preferences for LDCs (Clague (1972), p. 288), but
has otherwise been ignored in the empirical studies - perhaps reflecting
the general conclusion that the preferences actually granted offer little
incentive for increased exports from the LDCs.
Some ex post evidence of the influence of preferences on DFI has been
gleaned from Greece and Portugal. Despite strong incentives and guarantees
offered by the Greek government, DFI was negligible before the 1962
association agreement with the EEC, but since 1962 it has been substantial;
80 % of Greece' s long-term capital inflow between 1953 and 1972 occurred
after 1962 (Kalamatousakis (1976)). Such data, however, reveal little
about causality because world-wide DFI was much larger in the 1960s
than in the 1950s and the decision to invest in Greece may have been based
on factors unconnected with association (e.g. the political situation,
In a study of Taiwan between 1955 and 1971, when distance costs, political
stability and security could be assumed constant, Riedel found that
efficiency wage differentials significantly affected DFI from Hong Kong,
Japan and the USA (the three major investing countries) and government
policies (reducing costs and increasing export revenue to the firm) were
significant in the cases of Hong Kong and Japanese DFI (Riedel (1975),
p. 511).- 87 -
non-association-induced economic growth). Kreinin has identified specific
sectors in which DFI occurred in response to preferences:
" ... large-scale investments have taken place in the textile,
chemical, and metallurgical industries subsequent to, and as a
result of, Greece' s association with the Common Market. Much of
the increased output of these industries was exported to the
Community" (Kreinin (197 5), p. 356).
In a very general manner, the EFTA Secretariat has suggested that Portugal' s
preferential access to EFTA markets encouraged direct investment by firms
from other member countries (EFTA (1972), p. 102). In sum, there is some
indication that preferential access to developed markets has induced DFI
in semi-developed European countries, but there is no evidence on the
quantitative significance of the induced investment.
2. Private Foreign Investment in Israel: Past Trends and Future Prospects
Private foreign investment in Israel has consisted overwhelmingly of
portfolio investment and direct investment in manufacturing. Although the
former increased rapidly in the early 1970s, its share of the total has
been falling and in 1974 only 11 % of foreign investment was in securities
2
listed on the Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange . The level of DFI is strongly
affected by the security position. In the early and mid-1950s foreign
investment was negligible, but it increased from $ 13.8 million in 1958,
when expectations of relative peace had begun to prevail, to $ 169.4
3
million in 1964 (Michaely (1975), p. 152) ,.. Ajgain, after the 1967 war
2
Bank of Israel Annual Report 1974, p. 133. The increased absolute value
of portfolio investment reflected a substantial Israel-foreign financial
yield differential, which was primarily due to the prevalence of index-
ation in Israel. By the end of 1971 interest rates in the pricipal world
money markets were less than half of their January 1970 levels, while
the yield on financial assets in Israel rose considerably in those two
years (Ibid. 1971, p. 72). The differential continued to exist through 1972
and most of 197 3, but the Tel-Aviv Stock exchange entered a slump at
the end of 197 3 which led to a steep fall in portfolio investment (Ibid. 1974,
p. 134).
3
Michaely' s definition of foreign investment is that used in colum 1 of
Table 7.- 88 -


































































































Source: Bank of Israel, Annual Report 1972, p. 84; Ibid. 1974, p. 132.- 89 -
and the uncertainties of the semi-war conditions of 1969/70, foreign invest-
ment picked up rapidly in the more peaceful situation of the early 1970s
(Table 7). The level of economic activity in Israel has also influenced
4
DFI, as can be seen from the fall in DFI during the 1965-7 recession .
This relationship lends support to the view that the DFI in the 1960s was
primarily import-substituting, by firms trying to get inside Israel' s
protectionist barriers to trade. Even as late as 1969, DFI in Israel was
not generally export-oriented, but Hirsch' s survey of 194 firms indicated
that firms with foreign associates were more export-oriented than purely
domestic firms in the machinery, chemicals and electronics branches
(Hirsch (1971), pp. 130-1), i.e. the most dynamic industrial branches in
Israel. In view of the considerable tariff reductions which took place between
1968 and 1971, little incentive for import-substituting DFI remained in
1971 and it may be deduced that the 1971-3 foreign investment boom
consisted primarily of export-oriented DFI.
Future prospects for DFI in Israel depend primarily on the security
situation. Abstracting from that, the other influences on export-oriented
DFI all point to Israel as a favourable location. Israel' s skill endowments
do not differ radically from those of the industrialized countries, although
her wage rates are lower for both skilled and unskilled labour. Thus,
products can be manufactured according to developed country specifications,
but at lower efficiency wage rates. Israel is geographically well-situated
for exporting to western Europe. Finally, government policy is favourable
towards foreign investment and is unlikely to change in the near future.
If the positive factors offset the disadvantageous security situation, then
the higher export prices to the firm implied by preferential access to
EEC markets may be sufficient to tilt the multinational enterprise' s
decision in favour of locating in Israel.
4
The Bank of Israel gives domestic conditions precedence in explaining
the 1971 foreign investment boom, but presents no evidence in support
of this (Annual Report 1971, p. 75, Ibid. 1972, p. 84). The Bank also
ascribes a r81e to the devaluation of August 1971, but the relationship is
unclear if the devaluation merely corrected for differential rates of
inflation (cf. Dunning (1973), p. 316).- 90 -
3- The FTA and Private Foreign Investment in Israel
Although economic theory, the experience of European semi-industrialized
countries and past developments in Israel all indicate that the free trade
area will have a positive effect on DFI in Israel, it is impossible to
quantify this effect. It is nevertheless possible to say something about
the consequences of the increased level of DFI. An important aspect of DFI
is that multinational enterprises often serve as the means for transferring
new technology, but alternative institutional arrangements for transferring
patented or secret techniques (e, g. licencing, independent research) may
not differ greatly in their cost to Israel. The remainder of this section
will concentrate on another aspect of DFI, i. e. its effect on the capital
stock.
All DFI, whether it takes the form of establishing new operations, extending
existing operations, take-over of domestic-owned operations or equity
purchase, adds to the stock of available resources, but there has been
some dispute as to whether the DFI augments or supplants domestic
investment, i. e. whether there is a net addition to the capital stock or
not. A negative impact of DFI on domestic investment can result either
from the limited size of the product market or from the inelastic supply
of complementary domestic inputs; in both cases the arrival of the foreign
investor may crowd out a potential domestic investor. The conditions for
"crowding out" appear applicable to import-substituting DFI, which seeks
to exploit the limited domestic market and produces goods not in accord
with the host country' s comparative advantage, thus placing greatest
demand on the domestic inputs in least supply. Export-oriented DFI, on
the other hand, produces for the world market, where demand is highly
elastic for a small country, and employs the relatively abundant factors
of production. By easing the balance of payments and increasing govern-
ment revenue, both forms of DFI can potentially increase domestic- 91 -
investment . Thus, DFI may have no effect on the level of capital formation
or may increase it, even by an amount greater than the DFI.
An interesting attempt to quantify the "crowding out" effect in four
countries (Chile, Cdumbia,. Israel and Taiwan) has recently been undertaken
by Riedel. The model is taken from an earlier work on Canada (Caves and
Reuber (1971)) and in its unrestricted form is:
(6) It = a + b Ft + c Yt_1 + d Dt + e (Dt . Ft) + f (Dt . Y^)
In the Israeli case the variables were defined as follows: I = gross fixed
capital formation in non-residential buildings and machinery, Y = gross
national income, F = net DFI, D = a dummy variable with value 0 prior to
1967 and 1 otherwise, and the subscript t refers to the year (1958-74).
A stepwise regression procedure was followed once F and Y .. were
entered, allowing only those dummy variables to enter which proved
statistically significant. A regression coefficient for DFI equal to unity
would imply that capital formation was augmented by the DFI with no
effect on domestic investment, a coefficient below unity would imply that
crowding out took place and a coefficient above unity would imply that
DFI stimulated domestic investment. For Israel Riedel obtained the
following result (Riedel (1976), p. 37):
(7) I = -867.3 + 0.213F + 0.476 Y + 1.745 DF
(219.37) -0.282) (0.46) (0.569)
R
2 = .969 DW = 1.967
where the brackted figures are standard errors. The coefficient for F
is very low (and not significantly different from zero) implying that
There is also some evidence from Hong Kong and Taiwan that export-
oriented DFI has a "demonstration effect" encouraging the emergence
of domestic entrepreneurs in the same area of investment (Riedel
(1976), p. 29).- 92 -
in the period before 1967 DFI displaced domestic investment and had
little net effect on fixed capital formation. For the period 1967-74, how-
ever, the relevant coefficient changed significantly and attained a value
of 1. 96, implying that DFI not only did not displace domestic investment
but also induced new domestic investment almost equal to the value of
the DFI. This conclusion fits in with the above suggestion, that DFI in
Israel was import-substituting before 1967 and increasingly export-
oriented after 1967 and that the former may be expected to crowd out
domestic investment while the latter might encourage new domestic invest-
ment. The regression coefficients in equation (7) imply that any DFI in
Israel resulting from the FTA will increase domestic capital formation by
an amount equal to almost double the value of the extra DFI.
Foreign investment is an emotional issue and undoubtedly has some
deleterious consequences for the host country, in particular the loss of
sovereignly entailed in extra-national ownership of productive factors
and the potential foreign exchange drain in the form of repatriated profits.
The loss of sovereignity is mitigated in Israel by the fact that multi-
national enterprises have mostly chosen to work in partnership with Israeli
companies or part-Israel-owned subsidiaries . The drawbacks of DFI are
also directly related to the degree of "crowding out", which is now sig-
nificantly negative in Israel. The direct benefits from the increased
capital stock consist of increased earnings for domestic factors of produc-
tion and increased government revenue. Industrial growth in Israel has in
the past been strongly export-biased; the elasticity of manufactured net
exports (i. e. gross exports minus import components) with respect to the
fixed capital stock in industry has been estimated at close to two
Such arrangements are encouraged by the Israeli government and are
attractive to foreign corporations wishing to maintain a low profile
with respect to their Israeli connection in the hope of not provoking
Arab reaction.- 93 -
(Halevi (1972), p. 298). Thus, increased investment in manufacturing will
ease the trade deficit. Finally, the DFI-induced changes in relative prices,
will have indirect consequences whose direction is uncertain.
4. Conclusions
The Free Trade Area will increase factor availabilities in Israel by
inducing new direct foreign investment. The direct effect of the DFI is to
increase the capital stock by approximately twice the amount of DFI. The
increased capital stock will raise domestic factor earnings and government
revenue, and ease the foreign exchange constraint. These growth and wel-
fare benefits appear likely to outweigh the disadvantages of reduced Israeli
control over economic decisions within Israel and a future outflow of
repatriated profits.- 94 -
Chapter 9: Summary and Conclusions
The 1975 Israel-EEC agreement provided for the establishment of a free
trade area in manufactured goods between the signatories. This study has
attempted to evaluate the economic consequences for Israel of the FTA. The
trade effects were calculated from aggregate demand and supply elasticities
for manufactured goods. The various sources of welfare gains and losses
suggested by customs union theory vere then analyzed in the specific context
of the Israeli economy. In this chapter the results are summarized and the
optimality of the FTA as a trade policy for Israel is discussed.
1. The Economic Consequences of the FTA
Since the FTA specifically concerns only commodity trade, all economic
consequences must stem from actual or potential changes in trade flows. The
immediate impact of reciprocal tariff elimination by Israel and the EEC would
be to increase Israel's manufactured imports by some 15 % and her manufac-
tured exports by a similar or slightly larger percentage. Since Israel is a net
importer of manufactured goods, these increases imply a worsening of her
trade balance, her aggregate trade deficit increasing by some 14 %. The
staggered timetable by which the FTA will be introduced should alleviate
the negative trade effects to some extent. If Israel had an automatic adjust-
ment mechanism for removing external imbalance, the trade effects would
have no direct welfare implications, but in the absence of such a mechanism
and in view of the increasing pressure on Israel's sources of foreign exchange
removal of the increased trade deficit may have high social cost. Furthermore,
if economic growth in Israel is limited by the foreign exchange constraint,
then the negative trade effects of the FTA will have adverse consequences for
future welfare.
Customs union theory has tended to emphasize the classical gains from trade,
arising from specialization of production according to comparative advantage,
as the major source of welfare gain from a FTA. The net welfare gain from- 95 -
eliminating the Israeli tariff on manufactured goods is estimated to be around
1 % of domestic consumption of these goods. Since this gain accrues in
perpetuity, it is quite substantial. The estimated net welfare gain from duty-
free access to the EEC is slightly higher in total than the gain from duty-free
imports, but accrues to specific factors of production rather than to con-
sumers in general.
The FTA will involve two types of adjustment costs. Firstly, the structural
changes ensuing from the changed trade patterns require a redeployment of
factors of production. The worst social consequences will be felt by labour,
which tends to be imperfectly mobile between productive activities. Secondly,
there are the above-mentioned costs of balancing the external account. Both
of these adjustment costs will be alleviated by the staggered implementation
of the FTA, especially since the Israeli government will presumably retain
protection longest on goods produced by immobile labour, but this approach
also reduces the gains from free trade during the implementation period.
The trade effects of the FTA will stimulate changes in factor productivity
which will in turn affect the magnitude of the trade and welfare effects.
Increased factor productivity can result either from movements along de-
creasing cost curves or from downward shifts in cost curves. The former
appear to be of great potential importance in Israel, while the latter are more
conjectural. The consequences of induced increases in factor productivity
will be to improve the balance of trade and increase the welfare gains from
the FTA. If decreasing-cost industries are pervasive, however, the adjust-
ment costs may be higher since domestic production of uncompetitive goods
will be eliminated rather than reduced.
The growth consequences of the FTA are impossible to quantify, although it
is possible to identify preference-induced foreign investment as a positive
force. The actual path of foreign investment is heavily dependent on the
Middle East security situation but, abstracting from that imponderable, the
FTA will provide an additional incentive for foreign investors. The attendant
increase in capital stock would have a positive influence on growth and on the
balance of trade.- 96 -
Previous empirical studies of tariff elimination have distinguished between
long-run and short-run effects, the former being much the larger because
long-run elasticities exceed short-run ones. Magee, for example, assumes
that long-run domestic demand and supply elasticities are three times larger
than their short-run equivaJents, and he believes that this is an understate-
ment (Magee (1972); p. 665). Such an approach is avoided here, because the
long-run elasticities are far less meaningful than the short ones. The magni-
tude of the long-run effects will depend on the extent of structural change and
characteristics of the growing and declining industries, the realization of
scale economies (including dynamic scale economies from learning by doing)
and finally the induced growth of the capital stock. All of these have been
analyzed here and found to be potentially important, but their quantitative
aspects can only be guessed at after a more detailed investigation. All that
can be said with confidence is that the long-run benefits from the FTA will
be greater than the short-run gains estimated in chapter 6.
A final caveat to the results summarized here involves the possibility of
retaliation by third countries. As was mantioned in chapter 4. 3, this is most
likely to involve the USA, which is Israel's major trading partner outside the
EEC and which is opposed to preferential trading arrangements. The USA
will undoubtedly suffer some loss in export sales to Israel as a result of the
FTA, but these may be offset by increased future sales in an Israeli market
growing faster than it would have done in the absence of the FTA. The
American decision is, however, likely to be taken on political grounds, rather
than based on calculations of economic gain and loss.- 97 -
2. The Optimality of the FTA as a Trade Policy for Israel
Israel had strong political motivations for seeking an agreement with the EEC.
Her isolated position among her immediate neighbours and her dependence on
the USA make favourable relations with the EEC an important goal. It is
nevertheless of interest to ask whether the economic aspects of the 1975
agreement, specifically the free trade area in manufactured goods, represent
an optimal trade policy for Israel or whether the politically motivated agree-
ment had an economic cost.
For a small, resource-poor, semi-industrialized country free trade appears
to be the optimum tariff policy. "When a legacy of protectionist barriers to
trade exists, the policy problem centres on the best means of moving to free
trade. The blunt policy of immediate tariff elimination would entail sub-
stantial adjustment costs resulting from the changes required in industry mix
and exchange rate (because of the increased trade deficit). A more sophisticat-
ed policy consists of across-the-board tariff cuts at regular intervals, which
lead to a welfare gain at every step (which is not necessarily true of non-
uniform reductions) and ameliorate the adjustment costs. This was more or
less the policy followed by Israel between 1968 and 1975. A third policy is
to conclude a free trade agreement with a large developed trading bloc.
Customs union theory concludes that unilateral n on-preferential tariff re-
duction is a superior policy to preferential trading arrangements. This is
clearly true on a cosmopolitan welfare criterion and the optimum policy for
world welfare would be ubiquitous tariff elimination. By emphasizing the
possibility of trade diversion and concentrating on the static welfare effects
of increased imports, customs union theorists have generally come to the
conclusion that unilateral tariff cuts are superior even on nationalist welfare
criteria. Acceptance of this argument implies that the government's decision
lies between the first and second above-mentioned policy and should depend
solely on whether the reduced adjustment costs entailed by staggered tariff
cuts are greater or less than the welfare losses from the tariffs remaining
during the transition period.
cf. Wonnacott and Wonnacott (1967), pp. 308-18, for discussion of this
question.- 98 -
In his 1968 study of Israel and the EEC Kreinin accepted the principle of the
CU theorists' argument, but contended that unilateral tariff elimination was
not politically feasible:
"Clearly the dismantling of the tariff wall and the establishment
of an equilibrium exchange rate are steps which can be taken
unilaterally by Israel. But firmly entrenched economic and
political interest have frozen the institutional set-up to a point
where such a change is nearly impossible. Only a powerful
outside stimulus, such as the EEC, can force it on the country...
Although the government emphasizes the effect of the EEC on ex-
ports, it is from the freeing of imports that the main benefits
would flow." (Kreinin (1968), pp. 310-1).
The view of tariff policy formulation being dominated by the interests of
owners of factors specific to producing tradable goods is widely held and
undoubtedly valid for some countries. The second strand of Kreinin's
argument, i. e. increased export opportunities must be offered as a bribe to
producers in order to gain their acquiescence to tariff cuts, is also popular,
and, as the estimates in chapter 6 reveal, has a basis in the sectional
distribution of welfare gains and losses. In the case of Israel, however,
Kreinin's argument has not withstood the test of time. Almost simultaneously
with the publication of his article, the Israeli government began to implement
a programme of unilateral tariff reductions without any outside stimulus. It
can always be argued that further unilateral tariff reductions will be blocked
by more firmly entrenched vested interests, but the experience since 1968
strongly suggests that unilateral tariff elimination is a feasible policy
alternative for Israel.
The economic consequences of unilateral tariff elimination on manufactured
imports and of the proposed FTA are summarized in Table 8. Column (1)
gives the consequences of the unilateral policy, while column (3) refers to
the FTA. The differences between the consequences of the two policies are
contained in column (2), which is almost entirely beneficial to Israel. The
deleterious consequences of unilateral tariff cuts, i.e. an increased trade
deficit and frictional unemployment, are considerably alleviated by the
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external tariff. In general, it can be noted that the welfare gains from free
access to EEC markets are not marginal, but are greater than the benefits
from the freeing of imports. The estimated static welfare gains were ca.
I£ 150 million per annum from eliminating Israeli tariffs and ca. I£ 164
million per annum from elimination of the CET, while the scale and growth
effects from free EEC market access are undoubtedly greater than from the
freeing of imports.
In a world of perfect adjustment and independent trade policies, Israel's best
policy would be unilateral tariff elimination, but under real world conditions
a FTA with a large developed trading bloc may be superior. If the bloc is
competitive in all goods at world prices, then this policy permits all the
gains from trade, it allows negotiation of staggered tariff cuts (if this is
desired) and furthermore yields the benefits of preferential access into a
major export market. These conditions are met by the FTA with the EEC.
The optimality of. the FTA also holds vis-a-vis a customs union between
Israel and the EEC. The advantage of a customs union is that the common
tariff on third country imports removes the administrative complication of
rules of origin, but its disadvantage is that reductions in the external tariff
are not easily agreed upon. Israel's optimal future policy is to continue to
reduce, and eventually to eliminate, tariffs on non-EEC trade.- 101 -
Appendix
A crucial assumption of the analysis in chapters 5 and 6 is that Israel faced
a perfectly elastic supply of imports from the EEC at world prices. In this
appendix the theoretical significance and the empirical plausibility of the
assumption are considered. Although non-horizontal import supply curves
would complicate the analysis, in a country as small as Israel they seem
unlikely for the vast majority of importables. The discussion will therefore
be limited to the price at which the EEC can or will supply Israel.
If the EEC export price of a good exceeds the world price, then the free
trade area will have two effects on Israel's imports of the good. Firstly,
there will be trade creation as imports from the EEC replace the sales of
inefficient domestic producers. Secondly, there will be trade diversion as
Israeli importers substitute purchases from relatively inefficient EEC
producers for purchases from extra-EEC sources whose tariff-ridden prices
exceed the tariff-free EEC producers' prices. The magnitude of these two
effects is illustrated in Figure Al, which embodies the same assumption as
Figure 3. If EEC producers can only supply imports at a Price OJ> rather
than the world price, OK, then the welfare benefit to Israeli consumers is
equal to A + B + G + E, offset by losses of producer surplus (A) and govern-
ment revenue (G + G ). V/hether the net static welfare effect is positive or
negative depends on the size of the triangles B and E relative to the dead-
weight loss from trade diversion, G . Imports will increase, but by a
smaller extent than indicated in Table 2.
In comparison to the n on-discriminating zero-tariff situation the welfare
effect of the preferences to the EEC can never be positive. The difference
will be zero if OJ = OK, in which case the estimates in chapter 6 will be
appropriate measures of the benefit from preferences offered to the EEC*
As the differential between the price on imports from the EEC and the world
price increases, so do the costs from not pursuing unilateral non-dis-
criminatory tariff elimination. Furthermore this relationship is not- 102 -
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proportional; the welfare loss from a 10 % difference between OJ and OK
will be more than twice as great as that from a 5 % difference. Thus,
assessment of the probable relationship between the price of tariff-free
imports from the EEC and the world price is crucial. Extension of the
analysis to the multi-good situation intensifies the problem, because diver-
gence of EEC prices from the world price of any good produces a second-
best situation for which unambiguous welfare conclusions cannot be drawn.
The ability of EEC producers to sell in Israel at the world price can be
judged from their exports to Israel before receiving preferential entry. In
aggregate terms there can be little doubt of this ability since almost half of
Israel's total imports originate in the EEC, $ 2000 m. out of a total of
$ 4, 237 m. in 1974. A breakdown of manufactured imports by BTN chapter
indicates that the EEC covers the whole spectrum of such imports. The EEC
failed to supply Israel in only one 3TN chapter and that was the minor
chapter "coin", for which Israel's 1971 imports were a mere $ 2000.
Although a finer commodity breakdown may reveal further areas in which
no EEC producers can sell at the world price, the general capability of
The welfare loss from preferential zero-tariffs on imports from the EEC
rather than across-the-board tariff elimination is equal to the areas
F + F + F + G
x in Figure Al. A formula for calculating this loss can
readily be derived from formulae (1) and (2) in the text. The first two
derivatives with respect to JK are:
e OX e OY
f (JK) =
 S JK -
 D JK + XY
GET OET
and e OX - e OY
f" (JK) = -5 -2
QfT
Since both of these are positive, the two propositions advanced in the
text concerning the relationship between the size of the welfare loss and
JK are proven.- 104 -
2
EEC exporters to offer goods to Israel at this price seems clear.
Although EEC producers are able to sell in Israel at Price OK, there is an
incentive for them to exploit a monopoly situation by selling at a higher
price (between OK and OH). Such an action would cause a loss to Israel
vis-a-vis the free trade situation, but would increase the producers' surplus
of the EEC suppliers. It would also gain support from Israeli competitors
who would be pleased to see the price sticking above OK, since some of their
producers' surplus would then remain. Such a situation occurred in some
countries offering reverse preferences to the EEC under the Yaounde^ Con-
vention because, as a consequence of their cultural ties to France, their
import trade was dominated by French monopolists; the LDCs' governments
lost tariff revenue and their consumers gained hardly anything, while there
was a welfare transfer to the French monopolists (Kreinin (1973a)). This is
unlikely to happen in Israel, because she has no special ties to any single
EEC member and the forces of competition between EEC producers can be
expected to keep prices down to the "world price". Table Al indicates that
in over 80 % of the BTN chapters covered by our analysis Israel's imports
came from at least five EEC countries. Furthermore, the chapters supplied
by few EEC countries were either tariff-free in 1971 or accounted for a
3
minor share of Israel's total imports. Although the number of individual
suppliers is unknown, the fact that they operate from so many different
countries suggests that collusion between producers to fix export prices to
Israel is unlikely to be feasible.
2
The presence of non-EEC imports in 1971 implies the existence of some
areas where no EEC producer is competitive, unless prices were equal
and the indifferent Israeli purchaser happened to choose the non-EEC good.
A more plausible defence of the conclusion in the text is that price dif-
ferences in these areas were marginal. It may be noted that the conclusion
does not imply that all Israel's manufactured imports will come from the
EEC in 1989, but has the weaker implication that all import prices will be
set by EEC goods or by competition from EEC goods.
3
Of the thirteen chapters with imports from less than five EEC countries
Israel's imports exceeded $ 1 m. in only two, paper making materials
and railway euqipment, and these goods were essentially tariff free.
Total imports from the other eleven chapters amounted to $ 2.0 m.- 105 -
Table Al: Frequency Distribution of the Number of EEC Countries supply-
ing Israel's Manufactured Imports by BTN Chapter (1971)
Number of EEC Countries (N) 0 12 3 4 8 9
f (N) 1 1 4 3 4 10 13 18 15
Note: f (N) = the number of BTN Chapters for which Israel's imports came
from N EEC countries. Chapters 28-99, excluding 88 (aircraft)
and 93 (weapons), are covered, i.e. ITf (N) = 70.
Source: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics: Foreign Trade Statistics
Quarterly IV, No. 4, Pt. 1.
In sum, EEC producers are capable of supplying Israel with manufactured
imports at world prices and will not generally be able to hold their prices
above this level for their own profit. Thus the estimates in Tables 2 and 4,
which essentially measure the effects of unilateral tariff elimination, are
valid indicators of the consequences of the EEC-Israel free trade area.- 106 -
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